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CHAPTER I* 
DEFENSE POLICY IN AN ERA OF TRANSITION 
Japanese defense policy is now experiencing a critical period of 
transition. In the 1970s, a combination of international develop-
ments and domestic political shifts transformed the postwar consen-
sus into the present debate. This new debate is characterized by an 
extremely broad spectrum of views and no fundamental agreement 
on policy aims. 
The creation of a new direction in Japanese defense policy fol-
lows, however, the collapse of the old consensus. That is, the incre-
mental political decisions and bargaining that are now determining 
defense policy are gradually working towards a new consensus on 
goals. This new consensus may not be solidified for quite a few 
years, but there are already signs indicating a more assertive defense 
policy for Japan. This could very well be part of a general shift from 
dependence on the United States to a more autonomous foreign pol-
icy, a shift comparable to Japan's transition from submission to self-
assertion in the first half of this century. 
As will be argued later in this chapter, the principal actors guid-
ing Japan toward a new direction will be the Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP) Diet members. It is for this reason that this paper will 
focus on the attitudes of these Diet members in this analysis of the 
development of a new consensus on defense policy. In order to un-
derstand the present defense policy, however, we must first examine 
the original postwar consensus and the causes of the transition from 
that consensus to the new debate. 
The Postwar Consensus on Defense 
The Yoshida administration (1948-54), in cooperation with the 
U.S. government, adopted a basic defense policy which survived as a 
mainstream consensus for more than twenty years. This policy es-
tablished Japanese control over internal security while depending 
primarily on the United States for protection from external threats. 1 
The United States continued to keep military bases in Japan, but 
gradually decreased force strength as the Japanese Self-Defense 
Forces (SDF) slowly expanded. This policy was initially created 
through informal bilateral agreements, and was later formally ar-
ticulated in the security treaties of 1951 and 1960. 
• All names in the text and footnotes are given in the Japanese order, surname first. 
I. Martin E. Weinstein, Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, 1947-1968, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1971, pp. 41-42. 
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Prime Minister Yoshida believed in strict limits on the role of 
the SDF. The most prominent force behind this position was the 
Peace Constitution, which was drafted at the end of World War II 
under the direction of the U.S. occupation command. Article Nine 
reads: 
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on jus-
tice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war 
as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of 
force as means of settling international disputes. 
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, 
land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential will 
never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state 
will not be recognized. 
Yoshida perceived a number of other constraints on the SDF. 
He felt that military expansion would be detrimental to economic 
growth, which was clearly Japan's top priority. He was also sensitive 
to the strong anti-military sentiments of the public. The Japanese 
people had personally experienced the dangers of Japanese milita-
rism and the terrors of war, and thus emerged from the war vehe-
mently opposed to rearmament. Furthermore, the opposition 
parties, and particularly the Socialists, strongly opposed rearma-
ment. The Socialist's position in favor of "unarmed neutrality" 
strongly appealed to the people. Prime Minister Yoshida, however, 
tried to steer support away from the Socialists by adopting strict lim-
its on the SDF for his own policy. Finally, Yoshida was very con-
cerned with relations within Asia. He felt that any sign of Japanese 
rearmament would excite an extreme reaction from Japan's neigh-
bors, particularly those which had so recently fallen victim to Japa-
nese militarism. 
John W. Dower summarized Yoshida's reservations in this way: 
He continued to argue that the Japanese economy, even 
under the war boom, could not stand the strain of massive 
rearmament; the populace, and especially the "tender sex," 
would not tolerate it; and a good part of the world would 
be appalled at the sudden spectacle. 2 
Underlying Yoshida's philosophy, however, was a basic assumption 
that became an essential element in the postwar consensus: that 
there was no immediate threat of Communist attack? 
2. John W. Dower, Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experi-
ence, 1878-1954, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979, p. 387. 
3. Ibid, pp. 388-91. 
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Given the overwhelming constraints against any significant re-
armament, the only viable alternative to the Yoshida strategy was 
unarmed neutrality, a policy strongly supported by the Socialists. 
Yoshida did not feel that this option would ensure Japanese security 
in the future and thus actively sought an agreement with the United 
States.4 This agreement nullified hopes for unarmed neutrality be-
cause any U.S. military presence in Japan rendered neutrality im-
possible. The constraints against rearmament on the one hand, and 
the American military presence on the other, strictly confined the 
alternatives for Japan's defense policy. This political stalemate was 
incorporated into the Yoshida strategy, and was not seriously 
threatened until the 1970s. 
The consensus was further characterized by non-confrontation 
on the issue of defense. Confronted with strong opposition from 
political minorities on both the left and the right, the LDP politicians 
carefully avoided any statement on policy that would meet with 
resistance from those forces. In this way, the LDP gradually turned 
defense into a non-issue. They were only foiled once, in 1960, when 
massive protests threatened the new U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. 5 
The limits inherent in the Yoshida strategy gained the strength 
of a national consensus because they appealed to the anti-military 
sentiments of the time, and because it had a clearly articulated ra-
tionale. The backbone of this rationale was found in the Peace Con-
stitution, but it was later reinforced by the popular acceptance of the 
notion of "exclusive defense" (senshu boei). This notion incorpo-
rates the following established limits on rearmament: (I) there will 
be no overseas dispatch of troops; (2) there will be no export of arms 
from Japan; and (3) there will be no manufacture, possession, or in-
troduction of nuclear weapons.6 The assumptions of the Peace Con-
stitution and exclusive defense provided the foundation for a 
national consensus which reigned until the 1970s. 
The Transition to the New Debate: External Causes 
A gradual process involving a number of international and do-
mestic developments shaded the transition from the postwar consen-
4. Ibid, p. 371; and Weinstein, supra note I, pp. 16-17. 
5. Concerning the Yoshida consensus, see Dower, supra note 2; Weinstein, supra 
note I; and Martin E. Weinstein, "The Evolution of Japan's Self-Defense Forces," in 
James H. Buck, ed., The Modern Japanese Military System, Sage Research Progress Se-
ries on War, Revolution, and Peacekeeping, Vol. V, Beverly Hills: Sage, 1975. 
6. These so-called "three non-nuclear principles" were originally articulated by 
Prime Minister Sato in December, 1967. 
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sus to the new debate. However, two simultaneous shifts in the 
international power balance provided the most fundamental force 
behind this transition: (1) the rise of Japan as an economic power, 
and (2) the decline of the United States as a military power. 
Japan's new economic prosperity became increasingly apparent 
in the 1970s. While high growth had continued since the early fifties, 
Japanese growth only made its impact on the international market in 
the 1970s. Japan began to export vast quantities of manufactured 
products, and proved stronger than other industrialized nations in 
the face of the oil crises. This prosperity stimulated a reconsidera-
tion of Japan's role in the world. Critics began to argue that Japan 
should take more responsibility for its own national security, and 
decrease dependence on the United States. Furthermore, many felt 
that Japan should take on a more active role in international politics 
in general, a role more appropriate for an economic giant. 
The 1970s also brought on a perception of American weakness, 
particularly relative to the Soviet Union. The Vietnam War was a 
vivid display of inept leadership and lack of U.S. military strength. 
Moreover, the Soviet military build-up over the 1970s brought 
doubts about the strength of the almighty American nuclear deter-
rent. The perception of weakness was enhanced by the relative 
American economic decline, as manifested in trade deficits with Ja-
pan and the demise of the dollar gold standard with the "Nixon 
Shock" of October, 1971. Skepticism of U.S. capabilities was cou-
pled with increasing doubts about U.S. willingness to protect Japan. 
The soybean embargo provided a glaring example of American lack 
of good faith which increased Japanese distrust. The "Nixon Doc-
trine," calling for more autonomous defense for U.S. allies in Asia, 
also served to reinforce doubts concerning U.S. intent. 
Japanese strength and American weakness posed a new chal-
lenge for the postwar consensus. These two transformations were 
reinforced by a number of international developments. The four 
most significant of these will be analyzed below: (1) the Okinawa 
reversion; (2) Chinese recognition of the SDF; (3) the Soviet build-
up in the Asia; and ( 4) U.S. pressure for rearmament. 
The bilateral agreement on the reversion of Okinawa to Japa-
nese rule was finalized on June 17, 1971, and reversion was com-
pleted in 1972, with very little domestic resistance. Nevertheless, this 
change implied a stronger role for Japanese defense forces. First, 
Japan was left to help defend Okinawa. Second, the American with-
drawal signified a partial "Japanization" of defense. Furthermore, 
the reversion signified the retreat of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, be-
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cause the Japanese non-nuclear principles dictate that nuclear weap-
ons may not be introduced on Japanese soil? 
The reversion spurred the pro-defense forces into action. The 
right wing of the LDP, and the forces for constitutional revision in 
particular, became significantly more vocal at this time, and even the 
more moderate Diet members spoke out for increased self-reliance. 
The strongest spokesman for this cause was Director-General of the 
Japan Defense Agency (JDA) Nakasone Yashuhiro (1970-71) who 
developed the concept of "autonomous defense" (jishu boei) for 
Japan.8 
The Okinawa reversion helped to bring the defense issue to the 
forefront, yet the "hawks" were still isolated politically and the op-
position was strong. This strength was exhibited as the opposition 
parties combined with the LDP "doves" to force postponement of 
the official beginning of the Fourth Defense Build-up Plan by one 
year, from FY 1972 to 1973.9 Later developments, however, served 
well to take some steam out of the opposition parties' cause. 
President Nixon's 1972 visit to China paved the way for a Sino-
American detente which eventually led to the establishment of Sino-
American and Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations. Furthermore, 
with the coming of this new detente, the Chinese expressed support 
of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), hoping that they would contribute 
to increased military stability in Asia. 10 There was no similar an-
nouncement from the ASEAN nations, but it was clear that Japan's 
neighbors felt less uneasy about Japanese rearmament than they had 
immediately after the war. 11 
These developments spelled political disaster for the Socialist 
Party and unarmed neutrality. The Socialist platform stood for dis-
armament as an essential step toward better relations with China 
and Southeast Asia. Thus a Sino-Japanese detente engineered by 
the LDP, coupled with an effective Chinese rejection of unarmed 
neutrality, was a solid blow against the Japanese Socialist Party 
(JSP). This was similarly a defeat for the LDP doves, many of 
whom were known to be pro-China. Thus Sino-Japanese detente 
7. Otake Hideo, "Detanto kara gunkaku e" (30 part series), Asahi Journal (12 June 
1981-29 October 1982), hereafter referred to as "Otake series." Concerning Okinawa 
reversion: part 2 (26 June 1981), pp. 32-36. 
8. Otake series, part 4, Asahi Journal (3 July 1981), pp. 28-32. 
9. Otake series, part 8, Asahi Journal (7 August 1981), pp. 28-32. 
10. Michael Pillsbury, "A Japanese Card?," Foreign Policy, No. 33 (Winter 1978-79), 
p. 16. 
II. Otake series, part 15, Asahi Journal (13 November 1981), p. 39. 
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was a strike against the opposition, but it was the Soviet build-up 
and the American pressure which gave the pro-defense cause its 
broad base of support. 
The Japanese have historically turned deaf ears on the Ameri-
can notion of the "Soviet threat," but events in the late 1970s dealt to 
the Japanese a bit of political realism. First, Soviet nuclear expan-
sion forced them to question the strength of the U.S. nuclear um-
brella. Second, in 1976, an undetected MiG-25 aircraft crashed in 
Hakodate, exposing the weakness of the Japanese early warning sys-
tem. Third, in 1978, 75,000 Soviet grounds troops were relocated in 
the Northern Islands (just north of Hokkaido). During this period, 
the Soviets deployed the "Minsk" aircraft carrier, the amphibious 
vessel "Ivan-Rogov," and the "Backfire" bomber in Asia. Finally, in 
October, 1979, the U.S. government announced the deployment of 
SS-20s in the Asian theater. 
These events had a decisive effect on defense policy. Japanese 
defense had found a concrete goal: meeting the Soviet threat. De-
fense goals transformed from "fundamental preparedness" to de-
fense against a specific threat. This made defense planning a far 
more precise art, with concrete and directed contingency plans. Aca-
demics and certain hawkish experts took on a "military realist" per-
spective, insisting that the level of defense should be set relative to 
the military threat faced by the nation. The Soviet Union forced the 
general public to think about this new threat, but many still believed 
that the Soviet Union lacked the will to attack. Public consciousness 
had been aroused, but it was the U.S. pressure which brought wide-
spread support to the defense cause. 
Although the United States helped create the Peace Constitu-
tion, only shortly after its signing the American government desired 
greater Japanese defense efforts. However, even though such figures 
as General MacArthur and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles 
expressed such sentiments in the 1950s, the first formal request was 
not made until January, 1980, when Defense Secretary Harold 
Brown visited Prime Minister Ohira in Tokyo. 12 His appeal was 
backed by a chorus of "jawboning" from U.S. congressmen whore-
sented the Japanese "free ride" on defense. An implied linkage with 
the trade issue augmented this pressure. 
This pressure had an enormous effect on Japanese attitudes, for 
the Japanese were acutely aware of their military and economic de-
12. Research Institute for Peace and Security,Asian Security, 1981, Tokyo: Research 
Institute for Peace and Security, 1981, p. 152. 
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pendence on the United States. U.S. pressure swayed public atti-
tudes and directly led to two important shifts in allegiance. First, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), which had been anti-defense on 
the basis of keeping stable relations in Asia, changed its stance in 
favor of a greater sharing of the defense burden with the United 
States. 13 Second, the trade linkage shifted the support of the busi-
ness community strongly toward compliance with the American re-
quests.14 These shifts were crucial in the transition toward the new 
debate because for the first time since the war there were broad pri-
vate interests in favor of a defense build-up. The U.S. pressure also 
changed the nature of the debate, inaugurating a new rhetoric of 
"burden sharing" and "cooperation with the Western alliance," 
which was far more effective as a popular appeal than any previous 
bids for greater defense efforts. 
The Transition to the New Debate: Internal Developments 
The above exemal factors were the most important causes of the 
transition, yet internal political developments also contributed to the 
creation of the new debate. A handful of shrewd LDP leaders 
played a crucial part in making the defense debate public, in raising 
"defense consciousness," and in creating an atmosphere in which a 
defense build-up could meet with popular acceptance. The first 
leader to perceive the need for changing attitudes was Prime Minis-
ter Sato (1964-72), who surprised many by speaking out frankly on 
defense. As early as December, 1968, he declared: 
The people must unite in the spirit of defending our own 
country and in thinking in terms of a more realistic policy. 
Only then can we come closer to the goals of raising our 
international status and securing Asian stability ... 15 
Nakasone, in tum, was the first to use the office of Director-
General of the JDA as a means of influencing public views. He de-
veloped a theory of "autonomous defense," claiming that Japan 
needed to transform from a "pacifist nation" (heiwa kokka) into a 
"normal nation" (tsujo kokka ). He appealed to the people, insisting 
that his goal was no more than a reasonable non-nuclear defense 
structure modeled after the NATO countries. Finally, Nakasone 
tried to gather public support with the publication of the first De-
13. Otake series, part 26, Asahi Journal (15 October 1982), pp. 30-35. 
14. Otake series, part 27, Asahi Journal (22 October 1982), pp. 34-39. 
15. Quoted in Otake Series, part 3, Asahi Journal (26 June 1981), p. 33. 
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fense White Paper on October 20, 1970. 16 
The critical shift in popular views, however, came under Direc-
tor-General Sakata Michita with Diet approval of the National De-
fense Program Outline (NDPO) on October 29, 1976. The outline 
sketched the guidelines for a major defense build-up, yet it met with 
surprisingly little public resistance. The Outline was successful be-
cause it did not specify a time period in which the goals had to be 
reached, and it was accompanied with clearly established limits on 
military expansion. The Outline limited the SDF role to repelling "a 
limited and small-scale attack," and a November 5 Cabinet agree-
ment set a limit on defense spending of one percent of GNP. Fur-
thermore, the Outline was designed as a limit as well as a goal, not to 
be exceeded once it was realized. These limits made the Outline an 
extremely elusive target for opposition party criticism, and helped it 
appeal to the general public. 
The Outline was also successful because it was developed by 
Sakata Michita, a well-respected party politician, under the rela-
tively dovish Miki administration. Sakata raised defense conscious-
ness without appearing as a hawk. In order to popularize the issue, 
he set up a "committee on defense problems" to educate the public; 
he finalized the creation of the National Security Council (kokubo 
kaigi); he laid the foundations for a Diet committee on defense; and 
he initiated the annual publication of White Papers. Sakata also 
broke the taboo of joint operations with U.S. forces, establishing a 
bilateral committee with Defense Secretary Schlesinger in August, 
1975. 17 
Defense emerged from the Sakata era as a national issue, with 
the goals of the Outline accepted by a large portion of the popula-
tion. Sakata's successors could do no better than to follow his lead 
in creating popular support and acceptance of a defense build-up. 
The Fukuda administration continued to cultivate popular sup-
port under Director-General Kanemaru Shin (1977-78). Kanemaru 
tried to weaken the opposition's case by carefully avoiding any mili-
taristic statements, while subtly sabotaging the opposition's argu-
ment. He thus made a concerted effort to ridicule the argument that 
the F-15s should be "fixed" so that they could not execute missions 
overseas. He also introduced taboo notions such as "threat" and 
"deterrence" into the everyday rhetoric of the defense debate. 18 
Prime Minister Fukuda himself took a stab at the nuclear allergy, 
16. Otake series, part 4, Asahi Journal (3 July 1981), pp. 28-32. 
17. Otake series, part 12, Asahi Journal (II September 1981), pp. 33-37. 
18. Otake series, part 15, Asahi Journal (13 November 1981), pp. 35-39. 
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declaring that defensive nuclear weapons and biological warfare are 
not contrary to the Constitution. 
The appeal for the "understanding of the people" continued 
under Prime Ministers Ohira and Suzuki, and continues today under 
Prime Minister Nakasone. In fact, it is likely that such famous 
"bloopers" as Ohira's mention of the U.S.-Japan "alliance," and 
Nakasone's reference to Japan's defense force as an "unsinkable air-
craft carrier" may have merely been ways of breaking down the pop-
ular defense taboo. 
The Nature of the New Debate 
Fundamentally, the transition to the new debate was simply a 
move from an era of consensus to the present era in which Yoshida's 
limits against rearmament are questioned seriously. The Yoshida 
strategy, previously most seriously challenged by the Socialists' call 
for disarmament, is now challenged by a cry for rearmament. In 
addition to this central shift, there have been several subordinate de-
velopments. First, a debate over the SDF's constitutionality has 
turned into a debate over the SDF's military capability. In other 
words, the SDF has become accepted and the new debate focuses on 
its force level. Second, the Japanese now perceive Japan as part of 
the Western alliance. While they used to concentrate solely on the 
possibility of direct attack, they are now beginning to assess the indi-
rect threat: the threat to the West as a whole. Finally, the assump-
tions of "small-Japanism" (sho nihon shugi) have come under fire. 
That is, officials now question whether Japan should not play a 
larger role in the international political scene. Another major 
change has been in the scope of the debate. The previous non-issue 
has now emerged as an open debate, boasting a vast range of views, 
all articulated and argued publicly. 
The transition to the new debate was most clearly reflected in 
two fundamental changes in the LDP position on defense. First, the 
LDP gradually shifted toward a more assertive defense policy. The 
following chapters will analyze in detail this change. Second, the 
LDP took on a larger role in the defense policy-making process. The 
second shift suggests that the LDP will take the lead in guiding Ja-
pan toward a new direction in defense. 
The LDP's New Role in Defense Policy-Making 
With the transition away from the Yoshida consensus, LDP 
Diet Members have taken on a far more active role on defense is-
sues. As defense became less of a public taboo, it also became less of 
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a political taboo. Traditionally, any association with defense has 
been equated with lost votes, and this belief seemed to be confirmed 
as a number of old hawks, including the "Defense Tribe" leader of 
the sixties, Hoshino Zenshiro, lost their Diet seats. LDP Diet mem-
bers have therefore cleverly avoided taking any stand. But now, 
with the popular taboo gone, Diet members feel free to express their 
views. In fact, because it is still not a major election issue, Diet 
Members are more frank in stating their personal views on defense 
than on most other political issues. Most Diet Members today actu-
ally feel it necessary to have some sort of position on defense, be-
cause constituent interest is so clearly on the rise. Many Diet 
Members who previously were silent on the issue are now becoming 
more interested, and are forming a broad support system for pro-
defense interests. 
Furthermore, the number of Diet Members knowledgeable 
about defense issues has increased greatly. Many junior Diet Mem-
bers are taking an active role on defense issues, and a small group of 
experts has emerged that can speak on even the most technical de-
fense issues: most notably Shiina Motoo and Arima Motoharu. At 
the same time, the post of Director-General has produced an impres-
sive corps of more senior LDP defense experts including Nakasone 
Y asuhiro, Sakata Michita, Mihara Asao, and Kanemaru Shin. 
Increased LDP involvement on defense issues has led directly 
into an increase of LDP influence on defense. In fact, by the time 
the new debate took its full force at the beginning of the 1980s, the 
LDP had established itself as the dominant force in defense policy-
making. This change became clear as LDP influence grew relative to 
several other forces, namely: (1) the opposition parties, (2) the bu-
reaucracy, and (3) the forces of public opinion, the media, and 
industry. 
The LDP has always been in a leading role relative to the oppo-
sition parties. During the period of postwar consensus, however, the 
opposition parties acted as a powerful constraint against any move 
toward a more assertive policy. Since then, as discussed earlier in 
this chapter, Chinese support for the SDF and the limits established 
by the Outline greatly weakened their cause. 
The opposition parties experienced other problems in the 1970s. 
Popular support for dovish views declined, and the opposition par-
ties failed to come up with appealing counter-arguments for the 
LDP's new assertive stance. Finally, fragmentation plagued the op-
position. While the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) stood fast to its 
doctrine of unarmed neutrality, both the Democratic Socialist Party 
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(DSP) and the Komeito Party began to change their anti-military 
views. The DSP recognized the Self-Defense Forces and the U.S.-
lapan Security Treaty in 1975, and in 1981 went so far as to call for a 
revision of the Outline. And in December, 1981, the Komeito ap-
proved both the SDF and the Treaty, formally announcing changes 
in their foreign and defense policies. 19 
The LDP has also taken on a stronger role relative to the bu-
reaucracy. There has always been an implicit division of labor be-
tween the party and the bureaucracy. The JDA controls specific 
allocations and planning and has joint control over the budget with 
the Ministry of Finance (MOF), while the party sets broad policy 
trends and has the power of budget review. Throughout the era of 
consensus, this left almost no role for the LDP because they auto-
matically approved all budgets and they initiated no changes in basic 
policy. However, as the new debate emerged, the LDP took on a 
different role by setting new trends for defense. Professor Otake 
Hideo of Tohoku University argues that this is consistent with a 
party tradition of taking the lead on ideological or controversial 
issues.20 
The weakness of the JDA relative to other agencies and minis-
tries best explains, however, party dominance over the bureaucracy 
on defense issues. The postwar political structure put strict limits on 
the power of military officials, and anti-military sentiments have 
kept them in a subordinate role. Due to its lack of political clout, the 
JDA has consistently appealed to Diet members for support, and this 
has served all the more to bring the party into a role of leadership on 
the fundamentals of defense policy. JDA officials have rarely sug-
gested changes in policy aims, and the one notable official who did 
speak out, Joint Chief-of-Staff Kurisu, was promptly dismissed in 
July, 1978. 
The most striking change in the LDP role, however, was in the 
budget process. Until 1980, the Diet basically played the part of the 
"rubber stamp," quickly passing the defense budget. Incremental 
budget politics in Japan dictate that the crucial figure for the budget 
is percentage increase over the previous year, and usually all budget 
items increase at a comparable rate?' Defense generally has risen at 
19. Otake series, part 8, Asahi Journal (1 August 1981), pp. 28-32; part 28, Asahi 
Journal (29 October 1982), pp. 38-43. 
20. Otake Hideo, The Politics of Defense Spending in Conservative Japan, lthica: Cor-
nell University Peace Studies Program, 1982, pp. 3-4. 
21. See John C. Campbell, Contemporary Japanese Budget Politics, New York: Co-
lumbia University Press, 1977. 
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a rate of 1-2 percent less than the budget as a whole, maintaining a 
15-20 percent growth rate through the 1970s, which was enough to 
satisfy defense interests. Budget increases, however, took a sharp dip 
in 1980 as the Japanese government tried to tum the tide on a long 
history of budget deficits. The Ministry of Finance (MOF) began to 
set ceilings for general budget increase and for each ministry as well. 
This fiscal constraint suddenly made it necessary to fight for defense 
spending increases, and the growing number of LDP hawks were 
ready for this confrontation. 
For the FY 1980 budget, the "Defense Tribe" (boeizoku) initi-
ated a strong lobbying effort late in the "budget revival" (fukkatsu 
sessho) negotiations in December, 1979. They primarily operated 
out of the three LDP defense committees: the Investigative Commit-
tee on National Security (anzen hosho iinkai), the National Defense 
Committee (kokubo bukai), and the Special Committee on Military 
Bases (kichi taisaku tokubetsu iinkai). They lobbied prominent gov-
ernment leaders as well as the Ministry of Finance. Their lobbying 
only resulted in a moderate 6.5 percent increase, but the effort was 
significant because it solidified a strong hawk coalition in the LDP 
which has continued to grow in influence since 1980. Their strength 
was most vividly manifested in the "budget revival" for FY 1982, 
when intensive lobbying efforts actually projected the budget in-
crease over the MOF designated 7.5 percent ceiling for defense in-
creases to a 7. 7 54 percent figure.22 
These efforts are significant, first, because for the first time in 
Japanese postwar history, defense is a top priority item in the 
budget. Second, the LDP has gained considerable influence in 
budget-making, an area traditionally dominated by the bureaucracy. 
LDP influence has further increased relative to both the opposition 
parties and the bureaucracy through strategic use of its cabinet 
power. Since the 1970s, both Prime Ministers and Directors-General 
of the JDA have played an active role in shaping policy trends. Di-
rectors-General Nakasone, Sakata, and Kanemaru have all publicly 
encouraged a shift in defense attitudes, and such appeals have also 
been made by each Prime Minister since Sato Eisaku. The Prime 
Minister with the greatest impact on defense policy, however, is 
likely to be Nakasone Yasuhiro. 
Finally, the LDP has taken on a more dominant role relative to 
private sector forces. Clearly in some cases LDP Diet members sim-
22. Concerning the 1982 defense budget battle: "Tosshutsu e no michi" (31 part se-
ries), Asahi Shimhun (16 February-27 March 1982). 
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ply mirror the forces of public opinion, the media, and industry. At 
the same time, however, the party influences these forces in turn. 
Given this interrelationship, it is extremely difficult to prove which is 
the leading force. Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that the LDP 
has gradually gained control over private sector forces. In the era of 
the old consensus, the LDP was severely constrained by these forces, 
fearing that any discussion of defense could elicit a negative public 
reaction. In the 1970s, however, the LDP began to control and ma-
nipulate public views on defense. To this end Sakata, Kanemaru, 
and others embarked on their missions of "consciousness raising." 
Their efforts were extremely successful in raising awareness, and 
surely contributed in pushing public support of the SDF up from 73 
percent in 1972, to 85 percent in 1978.2 Similarly, zaikai (business) 
statements concerning defense seemed to mirror LDP statements, 
with only a 2-3 year time lag to show the difference. 24 
This new debate, a debate dominated by the LDP, indicates that 
defense policy is apt to move away from the Yoshida strategy. Al-
though there is a wide spectrum of views in the LDP today, clear 
shifts in policy positions hint at the new direction. The relative influ-
ence of the various positions has been redistributed, individuals have 
changed stances, and new representatives have entered the Diet with 
more assertive viewpoints than those whom they replaced. For the 
purposes of this paper, the spectrum of LDP views roughly have 
been divided into three groups: the "doves," the "hawks," and the 
"political realists." The following chapters will analyze each of these 
groups as a means toward understanding the new direction in Japa-
nese defense policy. 
CHAPTER II 
THE SILENT OPPOSITION: THE LDP "DOVES" 
LDP "dovishness" is not easily defined. Dove ideology is an 
integral part of the postwar Japanese political tradition. The ideol-
ogy emerged after World War II as a set of common assumptions 
and has rarely been clearly articulated or debated since, although it 
was to a large extent an integral part of the Yoshida strategy. In the 
present debate, the dove viewpoint is fundamentally that of main-
taining the status quo. There is virtually no support for disarma-
ment in the LDP, so the dove position is merely one of limiting 
23. Nishihira Shigeki, "Senso hoki, jieitai," Jiyu (September 1980), p. 95. 
24. This point is argued by Otake Hideo, supra note 20. 
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further rearmament. The ideology behind this position, however, is 
extremely complex. 
The LDP doves emphasize economic growth above all else. 
This priority was set in the Yoshida era, and was further developed 
under the "economic rationalism" of Prime Minister Ishibashi 
Tanzan (1956-57), a well-known prewar liberal. The fundamental 
concept of this view is that any militarization would directly threaten 
the economic prosperity of Japan, both in terms of budget financing 
and in terms of maintaining good trade relations. 
At the present, the doves' sensitivity to the financial constraints 
on military expansion most clearly manifests economic rationalism. 
Doves consistently side with the Ministry of Finance in its battles 
with the JDA, fearing that the defense budget will push out other 
programs. This was particularly evident in 1972 when the doves 
joined forces with the opposition parties and the Ministry of Finance 
to postpone the Fourth Defense Build-up Plan. 
Most doves prescribe to the notion of "small Japanism" (sho 
nihonshugi). They have little ambition for their country in terms of 
military or political power, and they feel that Japan should refrain 
from expanding its international commitments. Much of this senti-
ment stems from a reaction against the mistakes of prewar Japanese 
imperialism. Critics claim that such thinking displays a typically 
Japanese naivete, which assumes that Japan can afford to look in-
ward without taking a more assertive role in international relations. 1 
Doves have a strong faith in the power of peaceful diplomacy. 
They are acutely aware of the fact that Japanese prosperity depends 
on world peace and free trade, because of the overwhelming need for 
imports of raw materials. Many also argue that peace is more of an 
imperative for Japan because of its vulnerability to nuclear annihila-
tion. The best way to pursue peaceful foreign relations is to follow a 
three-part foreign policy designed to avoid war: (1) maintain close 
relations with the United States; (2) avoid confrontation with the 
communist powers; and (3) emphasize economic cooperation, partic-
ularly with ASEAN, in order to achieve harmony with the develop-
ing nations. This stance favors appeasement when necessary, rating 
the avoidance of war as the top priority in foreign policy. As 
Kitakawa lshimatsu (House of Representatives) put it: "Diplomacy 
means creating an atmosphere where arms are unnecessary."2 
I. For a discussion of "Small Japanism", see Ishida Hakuei, "Sho nihonshugi ni 
kaere," Chuo Koron, July, 1982. 
2. Shinsei Kurabu, Nihon no sentaku, Tokyo: Shinsei kurabu, 1982, p. 66. 
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Doves characteristically deny that there is a Soviet threat to Ja-
pan. While they recognize Soviet military capabilities, they contend 
that the Soviet Union would never have the will to attack Japan. 
They do not feel that the Soviet Union has any real imperialistic 
ambitions, and they argue that the U.S. nuclear umbrella provides a 
more than adequate deterrent against Soviet attack. 
In denying any specific threat, the doves challenge military real-
ism and the corresponding notion of "necessary defense strength." 
Instead, they contend that Japan only needs "fundamental defense 
strength" (kiban teki boeiryoku ). The 1957 "Basic Guidelines for 
Defense Preparedness" and the 1976 National Defense Program 
Outline propounded this view. It differs significantly from the mili-
tary realist view in that it asserts that defense needs are basically 
static, and do not need to be constantly revised in order to compen-
sate for improvements in enemy forces. 
Perhaps the most important element of the dove ideology is a 
deep-seated fear of militarism. This grows out of the Japanese expe-
rience in World War II and has strong roots in public opinion as 
well. Doves are afraid that the Japanese military is still ruled by 
prewar military structure, which could be very dangerous if un-
leashed. The Japanese still doubt the government's ability to control 
these forces. Yoshida's grandson Aso Taro (HR) discussed this: 
In America, the antithesis of democracy is communism. In 
Japan, the antithesis of democracy is militarism. Democ-
racy came here suddenly, along with the Americans. We 
didn't get democracy by our own hands ... Most Japanese 
still doubt whether politicians are strong enough - or wise 
enough- to control the military. This is something which 
is rarely talked about in public, but clearly exists in the 
Japanese subconscious. This is why the Japanese [politi-
cians] try to control military expansion.3 
Doves are not only suspicious of military leaders, but also are wary 
of the weapons themselves. They have never accepted the American 
notion of deterrence because throughout Japanese history the pro-
duction of arms has been followed closely by their use in war. An-
other element in Japanese anti-militarism is a concern over the 
reaction by Japan's neighbors. Most of East Asia experienced the 
scourge of World War II Japanese militarism, doves argue, and they 
would therefore react vehemently against any sign of Japanese 
rearmament. 
3. Interview with Aso Taro (HR), Tokyo, Japan, 23 July 1982. 
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The dove ideology, particularly anti-militarism, is applied to 
policy through a firm belief in the established constraints against re-
armament. They support the Peace Constitution and all of the vari-
ous principles underlying "exclusive defense." They are also 
extremely sensitive to any negative reaction from the public or the 
media, and they often use this as an argument when they plea for 
moderation in defense expansion. 
Finally, most LDP doves are supporters of global disarmament. 
The issue is considered to be a problem sui generis to the superpow-
ers and basically unrelated to Japanese defense. It is therefore an 
issue which can be used to appease the anti-nuclear and disarma-
ment interests without expending any domestic political capital. It is 
clearly more an issue of rhetoric than of policy. 
The dove view is still prominent as a political ideology, yet it is 
not an active force in defense policy-making. To some extent this is 
because the dove ideology was an assumption of the Yoshida con-
sensus which rarely warranted debate. Despite wide acceptance, it 
remains today as an ideology without an active or identifiable polit-
ical support group. LDP doves are rarely interested in defense is-
sues, and they are certainly busier pushing for other items, such as 
welfare spending, than they are fighting against defense at the time 
of the crucial budget decisions. After forty years of unthreatened 
peace, the zeal that the anti-military cause had immediately after the 
war has gradually faded into complacency. 
The doves' political decline, however, has made its most dra-
matic transformations in the past ten years. The shift in the political 
atmosphere in the 1970s had a striking influence on the doves. Some 
doves were forced to conform to the times by the nature of their 
positions, some doves were ignored, and many simply gave up the 
cause. 
Doves That Are Not Doves 
Many Japanese politicians, notably Prime Minister Nakasone, 
are known as "weathervanes" because their views flow along with 
the political winds of the time. Such is the case with many LDP 
doves who refrain from confrontation with the growing forces for 
defense expansion. A variety of explanations for their inactivity 
remain. 
For a majority of the LDP doves, defense is simply not a prior-
ity issue. They have limited political capital at budget time, and they 
are generally more concerned with other areas. This reflects both the 
Diet members' preferences and their assessments of what is impor-
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tant to the constituents. Although defense is no longer "taboo," it is 
clearly not a major issue at election time. 
Furthermore, many have confidence in the checks and balances 
of the Japanese political system. They do not feel that the push for 
assertive defense will get out of hand. Sakamoto Misoji (HR) ar-
gued that although "hawks" dominate the party committees and the 
committee resolutions call for significant rearmament, any signifi-
cant move toward rearmament will be squelched as it moves through 
the party hierarchy and onto the Diet floor. While the one percent 
limit may be reached, he insisted, any more rapid change would 
meet widespread opposition, and less active doves like himself would 
begin to speak out. In the meantime, he sees no such need. 
Hashiguchi Takashi (HR) echoed this view: 
If they said, "Let's raise defense spending to three percent 
of GNP," we would oppose them. But now they are not 
saying anything so extreme. They're just talking about go-
ing a little bit over one percent. This is a very delicate 
problem, and not something we need to make a great fuss 
about.4 
For others, compliance with the present defense increase is a 
more conscious decision. The most critical force behind this deci-
sion was the increase in American pressure for rearmament. All 
LDP Diet members realize the extent of Japanese dependence on the 
United States, and are particularly sensitive to U.S. pressure because 
of the linkage with the trade issue. The U.S.-Japan relationship is 
the backbone of LDP foreign policy, and thus it is difficult for LDP 
Diet members to fight the American viewpoint with vigor. 
Many dovish Diet members have consciously decided to ap-
pease the Americans because they believe it is the only way to avert 
full-scale militarization. They see a spending increase to one or two 
percent of GNP as a necessary evil in order to keep good relations 
with the United States, and as the only alternative to an increase to 
five or six percent for independent defense. As Kato Koichi (HR) 
put it: 
If the U.S. Congress decided not to extend the treaty, at 
that very moment Japan would start to become a military 
power. This much is certain. Therefore, in order to keep 
this treaty, we have to make efforts toward reasonable 
"burden-sharing ... " We must increase defense spending 
to the extent necessary to keep the U.S.-Japan Security 
4. Interview with Hashiguchi Takashi (HR), Tokyo, Japan, 29 July 1982. 
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Treaty in effect and to maintain trust between the United 
States and Japan.5 
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For one reason or another, the majority ofLDP doves have con-
ceded to a certain amount of defense expansion. Some analysts ar-
gue that the reason this shift came so easily is because most LDP 
Diet members never had firm anti-military views. LDP dovishness 
was largely just a reflection of the rhetoric of the Yoshida consensus. 
Ishibashi Masashi (HR) of the Japan Socialist Party argues that the 
LDP Diet members never renounced prewar militarism and the LDP 
dovishness is all just empty electioneering.6 Utsunomiya Tokuma 
(House of Councillors), an independent and former LDP representa-
tive, is far less kind in his analysis. He claims that most LDP Diet 
members just do what they are told, and thus the move from dovish-
ness to defense expansion was a natural result of the American 
requests: 
They just do whatever America says because they figure 
that increasing defense a little bit will keep up relations 
with America ... They're pigs, mindless pigs. They just 
squeal a lot and take whatever they're fed. 7 
The contradictions inherent in the position of these "migratory" 
doves is most apparent in the disarmament community. There are 
ninety-two LDP Diet members in the International Disarmament 
Federation, and not one of them is vocal at the time of defense 
budget decisions. One of the most ardent supporters of disarma-
ment, Hashiguchi Takashi, explains that disarmament does not ap-
ply to Japan: 
I support international disarmament. I believe that dis-
armament should be international, and I am a member of 
the International Disarmament Federation. But I'm not 
talking about domestic disarmament. The global alliances, 
starting with America and the Soviet Union, are over-com-
peting in an endless arms race. I want them to cut down. 
But at present, there is no need for disarmament in Ja-
pan .... Jafan needs to have enough military power to 
protect itself. 
In fact, Hashiguchi himself is a proponent of independent defense 
for Japan: "If possible, Japan should become able to defend itself, 
5. Interview with Kato Koichi (HR), Tokyo, Japan, 10 August 1982. 
6. Interview with Ishibashi Masashi (HR), Tokyo, Japan, 12 August 1982. 
7. Interview with Utsunomiya Tokuma (HC), Tokyo, Japan, 4 August 1982. 
8. Interview with Hashiguchi Takashi (HR), Tokyo, Japan, 29 July 1982. 
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without having to depend on the United States."9 
What appeared to be a solid base of LDP doves in the 1960s has 
suddenly disappeared with the political tide. This change pro-
foundly affected even the most powerful of the LDP doves. 
Doves in Power 
Japanese state mtmsters are the shrewdest of political 
"weathervanes." They cannot betray extreme opinions if they are to 
stay in power. Their foremost talent must be gauging the political 
climate and manipulating it if they can. 
Most of the political elite in Japan defy the simply dove/hawk 
distinction. Despite occasional ambiguities, however, Miki Takeo 
and Ohira Masayoshi played a role as the foremost doves of the sev-
enties. Both concentrated on economic matters, were wary of de-
fense spending, and generally prescribed to the economic 
rationalism of the postwar consensus. These two faction leaders 
were instrumental in constraining defense in the early seventies. It 
was primarily their efforts, with the backing of their factions, which 
enabled the opposition parties to force postronement of the Fourth 
Defense Build-up Plan from 1972 to 1973. 1 
As Prime Ministers, however, they were forced to compromise 
their positions and were unable to constrain defense expansion. In 
fact, Japanese defense took its most significant steps forward under 
their administrations. Miki's "limits," for example, in effect only 
paved the way for popular acceptance of military expansion under 
the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO). 
Ohira remained extremely cautious with the defense budget 
even as Prime Minister, yet he compromised his dove position con-
siderably in other ways. Under pressure from the right, he approved 
of a law offi.cializing the Emperor's calendar (gengo hosei). Al-
though this was merely a symbolic move, it was nonetheless a con-
cession to the right. Ohira also introduced the notion of 
"comprehensive security" to replace his previous foreign policy 
motto of "economic diplomacy." He was not hesitant to include 
Japanese contribution to the defense forces of the West as a central 
element in his program: "Complete defense preparedness is the 
foundation of the comprehensive security strategy." 11 At times, in 
fact, Ohira seemed to have lost his dovish ways altogether: 
9. Hashiguchi, ibid, 29 July 1982. 
10. Otake series, part 8, Asahi Journal (7 August 1981}, p. 29. 
II. As quoted in Otake series, part 22, Asahi Journal ( 17 September 1982), p. 90. 
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We must recognize the Soviet military expansion in the Far 
East, and as well as strengthening our reconnaisance capa-
bilities, we must have as much deterrent force as possible. 12 
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Ohira died in office and Miki is in semi-retirement, yet these 
two leaders are extremely important in that their factions remain the 
last vestiges of dovishness in the LDP. Their successors as factional 
leaders, Suzuki Zenko and Komoto Toshio, were both even more 
dovish than their predecessors, yet each soon found his position 
compromised as well. 
Suzuki took over the faction and the premiership when Ohira 
passed away in July, 1980. As a whole-hearted dove following in the 
tradition of Yoshida Shigeru, he had fought hard against the Fourth 
Defense Build-up Plan, and he was a strong advocate of global dis-
armament. With the exception of his speech on disarmament at the 
United Nations, however, Suzuki was unable to articulate his dovish 
inclinations as Prime Minister. As in other policy areas, he was ex-
tremely vulnerable to factional pressure from either Fukuda or 
Tanaka. He cooperated openly in the campaign for public defense 
consciousness, and he was responsible for the controversial joint 
communique with President Reagan, in which he pledged "even 
greater efforts" on defense. 
Komoto Toshio, who replaced Miki as faction leader, boasted a 
long history of support for "economic rationalism" and growth-ori-
ented politics, with no past support for defense at all. Even Komoto, 
however, was influenced by the U.S. pressure coupled with trade 
linkage. On two separate occasions in December, 1981, he spoke out 
on defense budget increases, citing trade friction and a lack of trust 
in U.S.-Japan bilateral relations as the rationale for his altered 
position. 13 
The Komoto faction is the most staunchly dovish faction, yet 
even views within this faction are beginning to shift. Significantly, 
the last two Directors-General of the JDA, Ito Soichiro and 
Tanikawa Kazuo, were both chosen from the Komoto faction. The 
Director-General post, as Ito explained, is one which cannot help 
but leave its mark on a politician. Representatives traditionally 
graduate from their term as Director-General and soon take on the 
new task of representing defense interests in the Diet. Ito is proving 
to be no exception. Although he had no previous stance on defense, 
as Director-General he quickly became regarded as a hawk by his 
12. As quoted in Otake series, part 23, Asahi Journal (24 September 1982), p. 38. 
13. "Tosshutsu e no michi," part 19, Asahi Shimbun, 9 March 1982, p. 2. 
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factional colleagues. He will surely be more active in defense as he 
steps down, and if he has his way, he may become a prominent force 
in driving the faction toward a more assertive defense position. 14 
The most ardent of the LOP doves to reach power in the 1970s 
was Sonoda Sunao (HR), who was Foreign Minister under Ohira. 
As a young Dietman, he voted against the 1951 Security Treaty, and 
was so critical of defense policies that some accused him of siding 
with the communists. 15 He disputes the notion of the Soviet threat 
and believes that Japanese foreign policy should stress peaceful di-
plomacy with China, the United States, and the Soviet Union. He is 
a strong advocate of detente and global disarmament. As Foreign 
Minister, Sonoda continued to oppose military expansion, and was 
actually quite successful in suppressing anti-Soviet views in the Min-
istry.16 However, in late 1979, the combination of the Soviet inva-
sion of Afghanistan and increased U.S. pressure on defense caused a 
shift in the policies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ohira 
administration. Sonoda was thus isolated in his continued emphasis 
on detente, and his political influence sharply declined. In later ad-
ministrations, as Welfare Minister and once again as Foreign Minis-
ter, he continued to oppose defense spending, yet his pleas were no 
longer heard. Sonoda's strong stand on defense effectively took him 
out of the most powerful political elite, and ruined his one-time 
chances as a possible candidate for Prime Minister. 
The Outspoken Doves 
The political tide of the transition era swept away many of the 
old doves, but that is not to say that a few idealists do not remain. 
As members of the LDP, their views are not so extreme as to con-
demn the SDF, but they have held their ground, staunchly opposing 
any further military expansion. The most persistent of these doves 
are two of the most senior Dietmen, Akagi Munenori (HR) and 
Ishida Hakuei (HR). Both of them have experience as Ministers of 
State dating back to the 1950s, and were prominent party leaders 
earlier in their careers. 
Akagi, who was Director-General of the JDA at the time of the 
signing of the Security Treaty (1960), has traditionally carried the 
banner of the dovish extreme of the LDP. As chairman of the Japa-
14. Interview with Ito Soichiro, Tokyo, Japan, 17 July 1982. 
15. Otake series, pan 23, Asahi Shimbun (24 September 1982), p. 41. 
16. Ibid, p. 41. 
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nese-Soviet Friendship Association, he has repeatedly criticized gov-
ernment policy concerning the Soviet Union: 
The LDP mainstream does not view the Soviet Union with 
an open mind. I am more flexible. Popular sentiments are 
also a factor, but the reason that attitudes are so bitter is 
because the LDP has a history of making the Soviet Union 
into the enemy; and saying that we don't like the Soviet 
Union and that they are a hateful nation. And on top of 
this, the Americans bad-mouth the Soviets, and sure 
enough it looks like we'll be at war any day. I disagree 
with this. 17 
He feels that the United States too often imposes defense policy on 
Japan. To a large extent, he believes that this is a result of a misin-
terpretation of the Security Treaty: 
The central military aim of the treaty revision was to send 
some of the American forces home. The other major point 
was for Japan to increase economic cooperation. Japan 
would be protected by the Security Treaty. No one had 
any intention of creating any "military alliance." 18 
The most articulate LDP spokesman for the anti-military cause 
is Ishida Hakuei. A one-time faction leader and Prime Minister 
hopeful, Ishida was for many years a powerful force in the party. 
Ishida's article "Kokusai teki sekinin o hatasu michi" [The way to 
fulfill Japan's international role] reads like a proclamation of the 
dove ideology. He questions the likelihood of Soviet attack and the 
existence of any threat to the sea lanes around Japan. He doubts the 
strength of civilian control, and he fears the resurgence of militarism. 
Furthermore, he is particularly wary of blindly following the United 
States. He argues that the U.S. pressure is badly intentioned, being 
designed to increase American arms imports and eventually to 
weaken the flow of Japanese commodity exports to the United 
States. He also disputes the "free ride" argument, insisting that the 
Security Treaty framework has involved sacrifices for Japan as well. 
Ishida agrees that Japan must take on a larger responsibility in 
the international sphere, but he feels that there are a number of ways 
to go about this. He proposes that Japan boost aid to the developing 
nations of East Asia, increase economic interdependence with the 
Soviet Union, and strive toward delinkage of trade and defense in 
17. "Jieitai wa 'senshu boei rain' o fumikoeta" (panel discussion), Asahi Journal, 10 
September 1982, p. 26. 
18. Ibid, p. 23. 
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relations with the United States. The military alternative, Ishida 
claims, would be disastrous: 
If Japan were to try to realize its international role through 
an increase of military expenditures, in the long run this 
would not only mean a weakening of the Japanese econ-
omy, a tightening of the political structure, and heightened 
tension in East Asia. It would also destroy any chance for a 
peaceful means of taking a role in the international polit-
ical arena. 19 
Thus only a few outspoken old men are willing to fight for the 
anti-military cause in the LDP. Although Akagi and Ishida have 
been influential in the LDP in the past, their day has passed. Their 
dovish views show that they have missed the boat on the political 
shifts of the seventies. Their views, which used to be part of the 
conservative mainstream, have been pushed aside as extreme and 
out-of-date. The other extreme, the hawks, are now gaining the at-
tention of the realist mainstream. 
CHAPTER III 
BEYOND INCREMENTALISM: THE LDP "HAWKS" 
For many Japanese, any politician who is concerned with de-
fense, and certainly anyone who supports defense expansion, is a 
"hawk." By this definition, the present mainstream LDP Diet mem-
bers are all hawks. In this chapter, however, hawks are defined as a 
much more limited group: those who advocate rearmament to the 
point where Japan takes on a significantly larger role in the interna-
tional order. There are a number of characteristics which distin-
guish this viewpoint from that of the "political realists." 
While the realists recognize the Soviet threat, only the hawks 
argue that this is a threat of crisis proportions, warranting immediate 
military preparation by Japan. They claim that the Soviet Union 
preys on weakness, and that only the fear of military response will 
deter Soviet aggression. In many ways, the hawk view echoes Amer-
ican Cold War ideology, insisting that it is only through military 
buildup on the part of the entire Western alliance that the present 
international "crisis" can be overcome. 
In assessing both the threat and the necessary response, the 
19. Ishida Hakuei, "Kokusaiteki sekinin o hatasu michi," Sekai, no. 438 (May 1982): 
p. 70. His views are also stated in Ishida Hakuei, "sho nihonshugi ni kaere," Chuo koron 
(July 1982). 
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hawks rely almost exclusively on military calculations. As "military 
realists," they equate military capabilities with intentions, and dis-
count political considerations. They believe that Japanese defense 
forces should not be aimed at a given level of preparedness, but 
should be designed to meet a very specific military threat: that posed 
by the Soviet forces in Asia. 
Hawks believe that Japan should strive toward an independent 
foreign and military policy. They argue that any self-respecting na-
tion must be able to defend itself. They appeal to nationalist in-
stincts in the people, insisting that Japan must "catch up" with the 
rest of the world militarily. They also feel that increased military 
power might gain them more respect in international politics. Aso 
Taro (HR) described this sentiment: 
They are trying to constrain our economic expansion. 
They are treating us badly because we don't have enough 
military power. Many Japanese think: "If only we had 
more military power, we wouldn't be pushed around so by 
the Americans and the Europeans." 1 
Although it is often hidden, a fundamental distrust of the 
United States motivates the hawk perspective. The hawks are con-
cerned about the need for independent defense only because they do 
not trust U.S. military protection. Kato Koichi (HR) explained that 
there are two completely different mentalities behind the present 
push for defense expansion. If politicians would only answer 
frankly, Kato explained, it would require but one question to distin-
guish the two groups: "In the event of an attack on Japan, do you 
trust the United States to come to the rescue?"2 
In terms of policy, the hawks advocate a build-up at a rate well 
above the present incremental expansion. They propose a restruc-
turing of forces so as to better meet the military threat posed by the 
Soviet Union. They oppose most of the established constraints 
against rearmament, first, because they hamper military policy, and 
second, because they claim that there is no realistic possibility of Ja-
pan ever becoming a great military power. 
Although the ideological distinction between hawks and realists 
is clear, in practice it is much more difficult to distinguish the two. 
This is particularly difficult because many ideological hawks in the 
Diet compromise their positions in the name of political expediency. 
Given the fact that the hawk view is still not acceptable to the con-
I. Interview with Aso Taro (HR), Tokyo, Japan, 23 July 1982. 
2. Interview with Kato Koichi (HR), Tokyo, Japan, 10 August 1982. 
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servative mainstream, the hawks are left with two choices for the 
present: (1) they can stay their ground as extremists- a path taken 
by the Old Rightists, and Nakagawa Group, and the military realists 
-or (2) they can play along with the realists in order to keep power 
within the mainstream. The latter was the choice of the most power-
ful of the hawks, Prime Minister Nakasone. 
The Old Right 
The ideology of the Old Right has not been a popular political 
viewpoint due to its clear association with prewar militarism, but its 
appeal to traditional values has carried weight in the hearts of the 
Japanese. Vocal representatives of the Old Right have always been 
on the periphery of postwar politics. They have been isolated from 
the political mainstream, and their numbers in the Diet have contin-
ued to dwindle. Their ideology, however, permeates the philoso-
phies of some of the most prominent LDP leaders, such as Tanaka 
Kakuei (HR) and Fukuda Takeo (HR), and they still have an articu-
late spokesman in the Diet in the person of Genda Minoru (HC), 
who was one of the main strategists in the attack on Pearl Harbor. 
Genda's ideology has a close link to the .prewar machismo of 
Japan's militaristic era. He glorifies stoicism and self-denial, while 
harshly criticizing the weakness and selfishness of postwar Japan. 
He is particularly critical of Japan's dependence on the United 
States, and he insists that it is high time that Japan grew up: 
For thirty odd years since the war, Japan has posed as 
America's adopted child. If we keep up our childish ways 
-requiring the blood of others [Americans] while refusing 
to spill a drop of our own blood, we will end up as the 
orphan of the world. Now we must stop being such a 
spoiled child and make a fresh start as a grown boy.3 
Genda is also vehemently anti-communist. He idealizes the in-
dependence and the freedom of the West, and sharply contrasts this 
with the "slavery" and "subordination" of the communist system. 
He insists that the Soviets are imperialists by nature: 
The Soviet Union - well of course I hate communism. 
But the Russian people don't want to conquer the world. 
It's the Communist Party that does.4 
3. Genda Minoru, Zaichu shoki o shiro, Tokyo: Zembonsha, 1978, p. 33, as quoted 
in Otake Hideo, "Jiminto ni okeru boeiron," Hogaku semina, Tokyo: Nitto hyoronsha, 
1981, pp. 86. 
4. Interview with Genda Minoru (HC), Tokyo, Japan, 2 August 1982. 
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Military strength, he argues, is the only way to prevent this tendency 
toward aggression: 
If they detect any weakness in the enemy, they will attack. 
But they won't if they might lose. If they think they can 
win, they'll attack regardless of treaties or anything else.5 
His attitude toward the Soviet Union is very much that of a military 
thinker. He follows "worst-case" analysis of the Soviet threat, and 
concludes that Japan must be prepared for all military 
contingencies. 6 
His ideology leads Genda to a fundamental disagreement with 
almost all of the present constraints on the military. He disputes the 
very notion of "exclusive defense." He insists that oil routes to Ja-
pan must be militarily protected and therefore the ban on overseas 
dispatch of troops must be removed. He even debates the three non-
nuclear principles, particularly that which prohibits the introduction 
of U.S. nuclear submarines into Japanese ports. 
Genda claims that the most important factor in military capa-
bilities is the state of technology, and he feels that only an end to the 
arms export ban can give the domestic industry the needed incentive 
to innovate. The export ban, he argues, prevents market forces from 
operating in Japan: 
You have to have a market for weapons. For other things 
too, there is no technological progress without a mar-
ket. . . . Japan doesn't have a market, so we don't get 
anywhere. 7 
Regarding the constitution as well, Genda's viewpoint is refreshingly 
clear: 
We have got to get rid of it- the present Constitution. If 
we don't fix that much, we'll really be stuck!8 
The New Right: The Seirankai and the Nakagawa Group 
Ideologically, the New Right is not much of a departure from 
the Old Right. There is no similar linkage to the prewar era, yet 
both groups share many of the traditional Japanese values. In fact, 
5. Genda interview, ibid., 2 August 1982. 
6. Genda's ideology is discussed in detail in Otake Hideo, "Jiminto ni okeru 
boeiron," Hogaku semina, Tokyo: Nitto hyoronsha, 1981, pp. 85-88. 
7. Genda interview, 2 August 1982. 
8. Genda interview, supra note 4, 2 August 1982. 
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at times the Seirankai appears to be more reactionary than the Old 
Right. Morishita Motoharu (HR), for example, proclaimed: 
The new Constitution emphasizes individual rights and de-
nies the value of the state as a living thing. Just as individ-
uals have rights, the state should have its own life as a 
collective of individuals. That is the national polity 
(kokutai), and in order to protect individual safety, the peo-
ple must in tum protect the national polity .... And the 
symbol of the nation is the continuation of the imperial sys-
tem and the existence of Shinto. 9 
The Old Right and the New Right, however, are completely in-
dependent political movements. The Old Right holds the prewar 
military perspective, while the New Right represents a new postwar 
"romanticism." 
In July, 1973, thirty-one junior Diet members joined forces in a 
political alliance which they termed the "Seirankai." Led by such 
figures as Nakagawa Ichiro (HR) and Ishihara Shintaro (HR), the 
Seirankai stressed four policy areas: foreign policy, defense, public 
order, and education. They emphasized spiritual issues and public 
awareness, particularly in their attack on communism. The 
Seirankai provided the beginnings of a new alliance, the "Nakagawa 
Group," the most recent new faction to enter the LDP. The Group 
has the potential to be extremely influential on defense issues, for it 
is the first faction to claim a unified stance on defense. 
The Nakagawa Group is typically "hawkish" in its analysis of 
the Soviet threat. Ishihara Shintaro, the Group's foremost spokes-
man on defense, asserts that the Soviet Union has gained the upper 
hand in the military balance, and that this warrants prompt action 
on the part of the Western alliance. Within this context, he argues 
that it is imperative that Japan take action in order to secure its own 
defense. In his article "Boei taisei no hasso tenkan o" [Toward a 
new conception of the defense structure], Ishihara attacks the naivete 
of the Defense Outline. 10 As a document written in an era of 
detente, it is not at all appropriate for the drastically altered interna-
tional situation of today. Furthermore, he adds, there is no logic in 
the assertion that Outline levels of defense appropriations would al-
9. Morishita Motoharu, in Seirankai kara no chokugen, Tokyo: Roman, 1974, p. 25, 
as quoted in Otake Hideo, "Detanto kara gunshuku e," part 9, Asahi Journal, 14 August 
81, p. 52. 
10. Ishihara Shintaro, "Boei taisei no hasso tenkan o," in Imai Hisao, ed., Myonichi 
ni idomu kodo shudan, Tokyo: Keizai oraisha, 1981, pp. 93-110. 
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low for the defense of Japan against a "limited small-scale attack," 
whatever such an attack might entail. 
He insists that it will be necessary to go considerably beyond the 
Outline levels before Japan acquires the defense capabilities it needs. 
He ridicules the present JDA emphasis on tanks and ground 
strength, arguing that the most important task of the SDF should be 
to protect the coastline by air and sea. He also favors Japanese de-
fense of the sea lanes of the North Pacific, as requested by the 
United States. 
The most telling point of his argument, however, is that he 
questions American protection of Japan. Under the present Outline, 
he insists: 
In an emergency, we have no way of predicting what kind 
of help we can expect from America, and without even a 
vague notion of this, U.S.-Japan cooperation on defense is 
just a bunch of talk. 11 
This implies that in Ishihara's view, military expansion is more than 
a mere sharing of international responsibility. It is a step toward a 
security structure which he feels will be more reliable than the pres-
ent U.S.-Japan security system. 
The Group's belief in a more independent Japan is reflected in 
their strong support for Constitutional revision. For them, the most 
distasteful aspect of the present Constitution is the mere fact that it 
was imposed on Japan by the Americans. Mori Kiyoshi (HR), the 
Diet's most vocal critic of the present constitution, proclaimed his 
reasons for advocating an "independent constitution": 
An independent constitution means one that is established 
through proper channels by the will of the people. For any 
nation to be truly independent, it must have an independ-
ent constitution. A nation that has a constitution given by 
another country is at best only half-independent. We be-
lieve that an independent constitution must be 
established. 12 
The most problematic aspect of the present constitution, Mori 
asserts, is Article Nine's restriction of defense. He does not feel that 
it is at all clear that Article Nine allows for the existence of the SDF, 
and therefore, he argues, revision is imperative. Furthermore, he 
II. Ibid, pp. 99-100. 
12. Mori Kiyoshi, "Kempo," in lmai Hisao, ed., Myonichi ni idomu kodo shudan, 
Tokyo: Keizai oraisha, 1981, pp. 130-31. 
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feels that the Constitution would be a major impediment to defense 
activity were there ever to be an attack on Japan. 
It is unclear whether or not they advocate an end to the U.S.-
lapan military alliance, but the Nakagawa Group clearly envisions a 
larger international role for Japan. Nakagawa himself likens this 
role to that of a Vice-President. As the number two economic power 
in the world, Nakagawa argues, Japan will have to spend much more 
on defense if it is to retain its spot: 
If Japan, which has made it all the way to the Vice-Presi-
dency of this corporation called the Free World, keeps 
thinking only of itself - even though this corporation is 
being threatened - it will be thrown out of its position as 
Vice-President. I'm not sure how, but it will be thrown 
outY 
The NATO allies might be a bit surprised to hear that Naka-
gawa has declared Japan as the new Vice-President of the Western 
alliance, but it is clear that other members of the faction agree that 
Japan should take on a leadership role. In another essay, Nakao 
Eiichi (HR) claims that Japan is already extremely influential due to 
its economic strength, and it needs a more assertive foreign policy to 
both enhance and beter guide this influence. 14 As the first principle 
for foreign policy, Nakao states: 
1. Our country's safety and prosperity depend on world 
peace and stability. Therefore, we must stand at the head 
ofthe nations of the world, and take a leading role in main-
taining a world peace and stability based on justice and 
fairness. 15 
Nakao goes even further in his fifth principle. He seems to imply 
that Japan should replace the United States as a worldwide protector 
of freedom: 
5. We must hold to and protect the principle of the free-
dom and dignity of man. We must recognize that the reali-
zation of this principle is the main task toward achieving 
permanent peace for mankind, and we must promote 
friendship with those nations that share this principle, and 
in cooperation with them, we must promote this principle 
13. lmai Hisao, ed., Myonichi ni idomu kodo shudan, Tokyo: Keizai oraisha, 1981, p. 
32. 
14. Nakao Eiichi, "Heiwa gaiko no gensoku," in Imai Hisao, ed., Myonichi ni idomu 
kodo shudan, Tokyo: Keizai oraisha, 1981, pp. 75-92. 
15. Ibid., pp. 83-84. 
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worldwide. Toward this end, we must cooperate with and 
support those societies, and their governments and organi-
zations, which are based on freedom and democracy. 16 
31 
If Nakao's statement speaks for the entire faction, which it ap-
pears to do as it was printed in a Group publication, the Nakagawa 
vision seems to go far beyond military expansion. Although their 
policy stances are more realistic, it seems that the Nakagawa 
Group's real long-term goal for Japan is a return to power in the 
world. 
Nakagawa's surprising suicide in January, 1983, has brought the 
future of the Group into question. Ishihara has now taken charge, 
and his strong position on defense could imply an even more ex-
treme stance for the Group. However, Ishihara lacks both Naka-
gawa's popular appeal, and his close connections with other leaders 
such as Fukuda; thus the loss can only signify a decrease in power 
for the Group. Nevertheless, the Group remains an important new 
force in the defense debate, and its appeal to nationalism and tradi-
tional values is likely to gain increasing support. 
The Military Realists 
Military realism is a new phenomenon in postwar Japan. 
Throughout the period of consensus, the SDF's role was designed 
primarily as a symbolic effort to appease the United States. Its force 
strength was based less on any actual military purpose than it was on 
achieving a certain minimum force level. Any military strategy that 
did exist was exclusive to the JDA, and was certainly not the subject 
of political debate. As discussed in Chapter I, this all changed due to 
the two key shifts in the international arena: ( l) Soviet expansion 
prompted a new public assessment of the military threat to Japan; 
and (2) American pressure forced Japanese leaders to understand the 
American perspective on the Soviet threat. Military realism, to a 
great extent, is simply the Japanese version of present American 
Cold War thinking. 
The foremost headquarters for military realists today is the 
Center for Strategic Studies of Japan (CSSJ), a research center estab-
lished by former JDA Director-General Kanemaru Shin. Aside 
from directors Kanemaru and Minowa Noboru (HR), the Center is 
staffed by a large group of military experts, mostly former officers. 
Many claim that this gives the Center a military perspective closely 
resembling that of the Defense Agency. In the Center's treatise, Ko 
16. Ibid., pp. 85-86. 
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sureba nihon wa mamoreru [This is how to defend Japan], they ex-
plicitly call for a shift toward military thinking. 17 They claim that 
postwar defense has lacked any strategy at all: 
Japanese defense has never had a military strategy. This is 
a reflection of the government's defense posture, which has 
basically been to leave everything up to America. Defense 
preparation has been no more than a gesture to the United 
States. 18 
They argue that the concept of "fundamental defense," which 
was most recently articulated in the Outline, helps to incorporate this 
lack of military thinking into the present defense policy. They criti-
cize this entire system of thinking about defense, citing four basic 
weaknesses. First, fundamental defense determines necessary force 
levels without any regard to the international balance of power. De-
fense policy, by definition, must react to the world military situation. 
Second, present defense stresses only force level, whereas any real 
defense policy must stress also popular support for the armed forces. 
Third, the notion of fundamental defense was created in an era of 
detente, and does not take into consideration the present level of in-
ternational tension. Last, fundamental defense lacks any military 
goal. It is not at all clear what a "limited small-scale attack" is or 
what defense against such an attack should entail. 19 
Aside from the lack of strategy, the problem that the Center 
stresses most is the lack of popular consciousness. They feel that the 
Japanese people are deluded in their belief that Japan is militarily 
secure, and they feel that one of their largest aims is to publicize the 
nature of the Soviet threat. 
This is How to Defend Japan is, as Minowa describes it, a 
"guidebook to the Soviet threat."20 The Diet members in the Center 
follow in the hawk tradition of an extremely grim assessment of this 
threat. In fact, they compare the present-day Soviet threat to that of 
Hitler's Germany: 
The present international situation is reminiscent of the 
nightmare of World War II. In 1938, Prime Minister 
Chamberlin made an agreement with Hitler at Munich 
convincing Hitler that England and France would not in-
17. Kanemaru Shin and Minowa Noboru, ed., Ko sureba nihon wa mamoreru, To-
kyo: N ihon senryaku kenkyu senta, 1981. 
18. Ibid, p. 109. 
19. Ibid, pp. 111-12. 
20. Ibid., p. v. 
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tervene, and eventually leading to the Second World War. 
The present day reaction against Soviet intervention shows 
a conviction not to let this happen again. The situation in 
Poland and the Middle East crisis are by no means far re-
moved events, but represent a crisis for the democratic na-
tions, including Japan. To what extent are the Japanese 
people really aware of this?21 
33 
The book certainly attempts to increase this awareness. The Soviet 
threat to the whole Western alliance, and to Japan in particular, is 
described in intricate detail. 
They clearly envision a far more independent role for Japanese 
defense. In particular, they stress that Japan needs to take responsi-
bility for sea lane defenses. In February, 1981, they submitted a con-
crete proposal to the administration and to the LDP leadership.22 
They recommended significant restructuring of the SDF, emphasiz-
ing air force and naval appropriations well above the 1981 Mid-
Range Plan and Outline levels. They called for an annual increase 
in defense spending ofO.l-0.3 percent of GNP, reaching 2.5 percent 
by 1986. Their proposal represents the most clearly stated proposal 
from the hawk perspective, and bears a striking resemblance to the 
more optimistic American proposals. This proposal is already play-
ing a key role in adding to public awareness, and provides a compel-
ling alternative to the uncertainty of the present policy. 
The long-term defense goals of the Center are unclear. The 
Center's leaders argue for increased autonomy, but they still operate 
under the assumptions of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Neverthe-
less, they make it clear that the United States could easily move out 
of the region in the event of a crisis in the Middle East. In this sense, 
although they do not reject the notion of the alliance, they assert that 
Japan needs enough power to be able to hold its own in the Pacific. 
There are a small number of military realists in the Diet not 
affiliated with the Center, who also seem to envision "autonomous 
defense" for Japan. One of the most prominent of these Diet hawks 
is Arima Motoharu (HR). He feels that Japan depends too heavily 
on America: 
Many people think that because we have the U.S.-Japan 
Security Treaty, we can forever count on the goodwill of 
the Americans to protect us. It is clear from the statements 
of officials on both sides that there is only a limited sphere 
21. Ibid, pp. 5-6. 
22. Ibid, pp. 445-71. The entire proposal is reprinted here. 
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in which cooperative defense operates, and that we, for ex-
ample, have to protect the safety of our own ships. The 
Americans might protect them out of goodwill, but this is 
no more than goodwill. Ours is a dependent defense struc-
ture because we have to depend on this [goodwill].23 
Arima believes that this arrangement is not enough to ensure the 
continued security of Japan, although for the time being it is the only 
viable alternative. Eventually, however, Japan will have to move to-
ward independent defense: 
We think that Japan must defend itself. However, because 
this is impossible at this time, we are operating under the 
cooperative defense structure of the U.S.-Japan Security 
Treaty.24 
Arima's perspective on the Constitution is similarly realistic. 
For the present, Japan must work within the limits of a liberal inter-
pretation of the Constitution. In the end, however, Article Nine will 
have to be revised. Shiina Motoo (HR), one of the most knowledge-
able defense experts in the Diet, echoed this sentiment. Article Nine 
sounds nice and it makes for useful rhetoric, he argued, but the prob-
lem is that if it stays around long enough, people might start to be-
lieve it.25 
In the past few years, the emergence of the military realists has 
played a major role in pushing Japan toward a more independent 
defense structure. The single most important figure in the defense 
debate today, however, is the same man who originated the notion of 
"autonomous defense," Nakasone Yasuhiro. 
Nakasone Yasuhiro and "Autonomous Defense" 
Prime Minister Nakasone is the political "weathervane" that he 
is made out to be. His political viewpoint has become equally mod-
erate and unclear in his ascent to the top. 
Immediately after the war, he directed a rightist youth group, 
"Seiunjuku," and even as a young Dietman in the days of Prime 
Minister Hatoyama (1954-56), he was a strong proponent of Consti-
tutional revision and rearmament.26 This sentiment stemmed pri-
23. Arima Motoharu, Boei senryaku no tenkan o, Tokyo: Sankei, 1982, pp. 84-85. 
24. Ibid, p. 276. 
25. Interview with Shiina Motoo, Tokyo, Japan, 20 July 1982. 
26. Otake Hideo, "Jiminto ni okeru boeiron," Hogaku semina, Tokyo: Nitto hyoron-
sha, 1981, p. 92. 
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marily from a deep-seated resentment of American treatment of 
Japan: 
Japan was left spiritually and physically handicapped due 
to American misgovernment. The claim to a national de-
fense that would not be manipulated by the United States 
- the claim for any defense of the motherland in the real 
sense - was denied. 27 
Nakasone later explained his feelings at the time: 
I was disgusted with those politicians who had made the 
war, with the outsiders, and with the Communists, and I 
felt a real anger over the oppression of the Tokyo Trials, 
the violence of the occupation forces, and the humiliation 
of the Japanese people. 28 
Nakasone's perspective had moderated considerably by the time 
he became Director-General of the JDA in 1970. He was more sen-
sitive to public opinion, and fast becoming the hero of the "new con-
servative class." Nevertheless, Nakasone proved to be the most 
hawkish Director-General in JDA history. As Director-General, he 
popularized the notion of "autonomous defense," but the theory had 
already begun to take its form the year before. In September, 1969, 
he shocked his audience with the following statement: 
By the time Okinawa is reverted to home rule around 1975, 
we should discard the Security Treaty, and build a new 
foundation for U.S.-Japan friendship. 29 
Nakasone left it unclear as to whether or not he advocated an even-
tual end to any military alliance with the United States, but it was 
evident that he sought a stronger position for Japan: 
We need to create an independent security policy for Ja-
pan, and rid ourselves of the impression that we are just a 
part of U.S. strategy for the Far East.30 
Nakasone kept his long-term goals to himself, but in a March, 1970 
speech, he made it clear what "autonomous defense" meant for 
short-term policy: (1) increased Japanese control of military bases in 
Japan; (2) higher arms production capacity; and (3) significantly 
27. Nakasone Yashuhiro, Nihon no shucho, Tokyo: Keizai oraisha, 1956, p. 7, as 
quoted in Otake series, part 4, Asahi Journal (3 July 1981), p. 30. 
28. Nakasone Yasuhiro, "Gijido no arashi no naka kara," Bungei shunju, April 1965, 
p. 126, as quoted in Otake series, part 4, Asahi Journal (3 July 1981), p. 30. 
29. As quoted in Otake series, part 3, Asahi Journal (26 June 1981), p. 34. 
30. Ibid , p. 35. 
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larger naval and air force appropriations. 31 
From 1971 to 1982, Nakasone was relatively quiet on defense 
issues. The popular view was not that he had lost his hawkish ways, 
but that his silence merely reflected his desire to become Prime Min-
ister. Even in this era of transition, an overly hawkish position could 
kill a candidate's chances for the post. 
As Prime Minister, Nakasone's "hawkish" leaning has emerged. 
He pleased the Americans in his trip to Washington with his com-
mitment to defense expansion. His assertive stance, however, has 
incited considerable negative reaction domestically. Particularly 
controversial was his reference to Japan as an "unsinkable aircraft 
carrier," and his declaration that Japan shares a "common destiny" 
with the United States, which many interpreted as an affirmation 
that Japan is no more than a part of U.S. global strategy. 
If the past year is any indication, his rhetoric will not be any 
disappointment for the hawks. Looking behind his political facade, 
it appears that the real Nakasone believes in a strong, proud, and 
militarily independent Japan. During his tenure as Prime Minister, 
however, he will stick to the present policy of incremental build-up, 
without any fundamental change in the pace of nature of defense 
expansion. Ironically, as a "hawkish" Prime Minister, like his more 
hawkish predecessors Tanaka and Fukuda, he may be more con-
strained in his defense policy than were his more dovish predeces-
sors, Miki, Ohira, and Suzuki. Due to his hawkish reputation, 
Nakasone is far more vulnerable to criticism of any pro-defense 
stance, and must strive not to appear too militaristic. 32 
Someday the hawk view may take on more power within the 
administration, but for now it is restricted to the Diet. The new 
forces of Nakagawa rightism and military realism are clearly influ-
ential within the party, and could very well be the vanguard on a 
new path for Japanese defense. For now, however, the realists re-
main in control. 
31. Otake series, part 3,Asahi Journal (26 June 1981), p. 35. 
32. For more information on Nakasone's perspective, see Ikeda Hisakatsu, Chokan 
sora o yuku, Tokyo: Feisu, 1972; Nakasone Yasuhiro, Atarashii hoshi no ronri, Tokyo: 
Kodansha, 1978; and Otake Hideo, "Jiminto ni okeru boeiron," Hogaku semina, Tokyo: 
Nitto hyoronsha, 1981, pp. 91-94. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE POLITICAL REALISTS AND THE 
NEW DIRECTION 
37 
The political realists represent the present mainstream view on 
defense in the LDP. Many of the former doves support the realist 
position, for a large part of the political mainstream has simply 
moved from the Yoshida strategy to the new realist view. Almost all 
Cabinet leaders are also realists, as they are responsible for following 
the mainstream position. In terms of policy, the realists offer a com-
promise between the doves and the hawks. They recognize the So-
viet threat, yet they do not demand immediate action to counter this 
threat. Some realists consider easing the limits on defense, but none 
feel that all limits should be abolished. Most importantly, realists 
are fundamentally committed to the U.S.-Japan security system, and 
make no pleas for an independent defense structure. 
Given these guidelines, the realists formulate defense policy pri-
marily on the basis of political calculations. Decisions are not made 
on the basis of military analysis or any ideological inclination, but 
by a careful weighing and balancing of political factors. Roughly 
divided, this balancing takes place in three arenas: the public, inter-
national, and domestic political levels. 
The most important factor in the public arena is public opinion. 
This element must always be carefully gauged although it sometimes 
can be manipulated as well. Other key factors in the public arena 
are media reaction and business interests concerning defense. At the 
international level, Asian reactions must be taken into account, but 
the dominant political influence is the American pressure for 
stronger defense. The most important arena for the political realists, 
however, is that of domestic politics. Here they must balance the 
hawk push for acceleration against the dove cry for a stop to military 
expansion. 
In general, the political realists simply seek to find an acceptable 
balance between conflicting alternatives. Occasionally, however, 
when the conflict is not easily resolved, they take a more active role 
in trying to make compromise politically acceptable. Most signifi-
cantly, this takes place in the drive to gain popular support for the 
present policy of incremental defense build-up. The first leader to 
adopt this active approach toward reaching a political harmony was 
Sakata Michita, who established the new political realism of today. 
Sakata Michita and the Defense Outline 
As a long time party politician with the perspective of a political 
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realist, Director-General Sakata (1974-76) tried to bring defense into 
harmony with domestic political views. From the beginning, he ad-
vocated a politically oriented perspective on defense: 
Many people think that defense should only be debated 
among the old military men. They think that it should be 
left up to the specialists. . . But in the present day that is 
not enough. I think that there is a way to bring today's 
realities into consideration. What I mean is that a civilian 
perspective is necessary. . . Experts often don't under-
stand certain things. 1 
His foremost goal in bringing defense into the political reality of the 
day was to gain the understanding of the people. He believed that 
public support was absolutely essential to defense policy: 
Without the understanding, the support, and the coopera-
tion of the people, even the strongest Self-Defense Forces 
with the finest equipment would be useless? 
It was toward this end, gaining public support, that Sakata launched 
his full-scale public relations and defense education programs. 
This constituted the first of his three basic principles for defense 
policy: (1) defense consciousness for everyone. The other two prin-
ciples reflected his awareness of the political constraints against de-
fense: (2) minimum necessary defense within the limits of the 
Constitution; and (3) full support of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. 
Sakata himself admitted that the cautious wording of the second 
principle was a concession to political reality.3 
Sakata conscientiously worked toward a defense policy that 
would be acceptable to the public, and which could appease both the 
hawks and the doves in a way that Nakasone's "autonomous de-
fense" had failed to do. As explained earlier, Sakata was able to 
accomplish this with the National Defense Program Outline. It ap-
pealed to both the hawks and the doves. It not only set concrete 
plans for a defense build-up but it also set clear limits on military 
expansion. 
Sakata's personal ideology reflects this same balance. On the 
question of the Soviet threat, he recognizes the threat yet denies that 
it is as immediate or as overwhelming as many hawks suggested: 
I. Sakata Michita, Chiisakute mo okina yakuwari, Tokyo: Asagumo shimbunsha, 
1977, pp. 32-33, as quoted in Otake series, part II, Asahi Journal ( 4 September 1981 ), p. 
36. 
2. As quoted in Otake series, part II, Asahi Journal (4 September 1981), p. 37. 
3. Otake series, part II, Asahi Journal (4 September 1981), pp. 36-40. 
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There is no doubt that Soviet naval power has increased. 
One could even say that the Soviet Union has gained vir-
tual control of the Japan Sea. I think this is a potential 
threat. That is not to say, however, that Japan is like Eu-
rope, where Soviet intervention is a real possibility. In that 
sense I don't think that there is any direct threat to Japan.4 
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Likewise, on the issue of Japanese military independence, Sakata's 
view represents a compromise between the doves and the hawks. He 
does not question the U.S.-Japan security arrangement, yet he does 
go as far as to say that an American response to a Middle East crisis 
could leave a weak point in the Pacific. To this extent, he asserts, 
Japan needs to become less dependent on the United States. 
The New Realist Elite 
With a political atmosphere where defense has consistently been 
considered a secondary issue, postwar Japan has lacked knowledgea-
ble defense leaders in the Diet. Only a few military men have spo-
ken out. However, the two political posts in the JDA, Director-
General and Parliamentary Vice-Minister, have provided a valuable 
training ground for the defense leaders of today. During their ap-
pointments at the Defense Agency, these Dietmen learn to under-
stand the details of the issue, and appreciate the military perspective 
on defense. 
Circumstances mandate that the Directors-General take a polit-
ically realistic stand on defense. They must take on the duty of rep-
resenting the JDA and supporting the cause of improved defense 
capabilities, while at the same time, as Cabinet Ministers, they must 
be extremely wary of any political controversy. Traditionally, for-
mer Directors-General have taken on an active role in defense issues 
in the Diet, but this custom took on a new strength after Sakata 
made the defense debate public. The most active of all former Di-
rectors-General, in fact, is Sakata's successor, Mihara Asao (HR). 
As Chairman of the LDP Investigative Committee on National 
Security and the leader of the "Defense Tribe," Mihara is the most 
powerful figure in the Diet defense debate today. He took on the 
role of a defense leader after a term as JDA Parliamentary Vice-
Minister in 1967-68, but his position took on a new importance since 
he stepped down as Director-General in 1977. As an experienced 
party politician, he has considerable influence with the other party 
leaders and Cabinet Ministers. As an independent, he has the ad-
4. As quoted in Otake series, part 12, Asahi Journal (II September 1981), p. 35. 
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vantage of good relations with each faction, but some analysts claim 
that he has less clout than he might have with a strong factional 
affiliation. Nevertheless, he has strong support from seventy odd 
Diet members who form the "Defense Tribe" and carry considerable 
influence at budget time. 
Many view Mihara as a hawk because of his position in the 
"Defense Tribe" and because he is so active in support of the budget, 
but a close look shows Mihara to be a model political realist. He is 
acutely aware of the political constraints on military expansion. He 
stresses the importance of public opinion, and advocates a clear new 
statement on defense goals which can then be taken to the people. 
Although he feels that the GNP one percent barrier might need to be 
surpassed, he feels that defense spending should maintain a compa-
rable limit. He firmly believes that it should stay with the range of 
one percent: 
If we surpass one percent, the opposition parties will come 
on the attack. We have to make limits. Even if we are be-
ing pressured from abroad, we have to consider our finan-
cial and political constraints as well. Keeping this in mind, 
if we pass one percent we have to make sure that this 
doesn't continue uncontrolled: from I to 1.3 percent, to 1.8 
percent, to 2.5 percent, and so on. 5 
Mihara's position, which is tied to political reality, seems to lack 
any long-term vision or goal. It is clear in Mihara's viewpoint that 
despite his "hawkish" reputation, he really believes in limits to de-
fense. He agrees with the concepts in the Outline, but only adds that 
the level of "fundamental defense strength" should take technologi-
cal progress into account. He feels that Japan should be able to de-
fend itself in the event of a minor threat and should be able to hold 
off a larger invasion for a reasonable period before reinforcements 
come from the United States. Still, he is firmly dedicated to the 
U.S.-Japan security system. 
He feels that Constitutional revision is impossible both politi-
cally and logistically, and feels that adequate defense preparations 
can be made within the present Constitution. Finally, Mihara has a 
clear commitment to "exclusive defense": 
Japan has promised not to become a military power. The 
Self-Defense Forces are meant to ensure peace. We will 
only maintain the minimum defense forces necessary for 
our own self-protection. We won't build offensive weap-
5. Interview with Mihara Asao, Tokyo, Japan, 6 August 1982. 
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ons. We will continue to honor this commitment.6 
Two powerful leaders within the Tanaka Faction, Kanemaru 
Shin (HR) and Yamashita Kanri (HR), followed Mihara as Direc-
tor-General. Although Kanemaru has since become a prominent 
hawk, he was very much a realist as Director-General (1977-78). He 
was extremely careful not to upset the opposition, and he continued 
in the Sakata tradition of stressing limits while trying to generate 
more public awareness. Yamashita (1978-79) also emphasized a 
commitment to the limits on nuclear weapons, arms exports, and 
conscription, while trying not to alienate public opinion. He too is 
now an active defense leader, although not as hawkish as Kanemaru. 
The present Chairman of the House of Representatives' Special 
Committee on National Security (anzen hosho tokubetsu iinkai), 
Hosoda Kichizo, was Director-General (1980) under Prime Minister 
Ohira. He insists that the present level of defense is entirely insuffi-
cient, and that spending increases must be pushed through. Never-
theless, he follows in the line of the new realist elite. 
In fact, Hosoda's viewpoint is unusually clear on the one point 
that definitively separates the realists from the hawks, for he firmly 
believes in counting on the United States for defense: 
Japan cannot defend itself alone. Japanese defense must 
rely on cooperation with the United States and the U.S.-
lapan Security Treaty. The only question is what level of 
defense is necessary for Japan given the present level of 
American military strength .... Only when Japanese de-
fense forces are combined with American forces does the 
Japanese defense structure take shape. It is useless to de-
bate the level of Japanese defense apart from U.S. military 
power and U.S. military strategy. That's nonsense.7 
He is not concerned, as the hawks are, that this puts Japan in a 
subordinate position: 
Many are bothered by discussion of Japan as a part of U.S. 
global strategy. . . This may not be the best way to put it, 
but this is the way it really is.8 
Ito Soichiro ( 1981-82) broke a long-standing tradition, becom-
ing the first Director-General appointed from a dovish faction in 
many years. Within this context, as discussed in Chapter II, he may 
6. Mihara interview, ibid, 6 August 1982. 
7. Interview with Hosoda Kichizo (HR), Tokyo, Japan, 9 August 1982. 
8. Hosoda interview, ibid, 9 August 1982. 
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play a key role in bringing the new realism to the more dovish fac-
tions, particularly his own Komoto faction. As a newcomer to the 
defense debate, Ito brought with him no biases on military issues, 
leaving only his acute political sensibilities to guide him. Even more 
masterfully than his predecessors, perhaps, he was able to fulfill both 
his political obligations as a representative of the JDA and his com-
mitment to observing political constraints. The result is a moderate 
and deliberately vague political compromise typical of the realists: 
As much as possible, our country must actively contribute 
to the peace and prosperity of the Free World. On defense, 
we must do our best while regarding our various commit-
ments under the Peace Constitution.9 
This new realist elite now diligently represents the JDA in the Diet, 
skillfully speaking for both the doves and the hawks. Combining the 
two in speech is difficult, but combining the two in policy is the real 
"realist" challenge. 
Political Realism in the LDP Factions 
LDP factions are not divided on any strict policy lines, and in 
fact, many argue that factions do not have policy stances at all. It is 
true that factions are primarily political support groups, and not pol-
icy-making organizations. However, the factions do have distin-
guishable leanings on political issues, and there is no doubt that 
factional politics plays a vital role in the policy-making process. 
As discussed earlier, the Komoto and Suzuki factions tradition-
ally have taken a dovish viewpoint. Nevertheless, many of their 
members have gradually abandoned this position, preferring to side 
with the realists. Furthermore, their leaders, Komoto and Suzuki, 
have compromised their positions as well. The Nakagawa Group 
remains only a minor faction but, as explained in the previous chap-
ter, it could be an important force due to its solidified view on 
defense. 
The remaining three factions, those of Nakasone, Tanaka, and 
Fukuda, generally follow the realist perspective, although there are 
some notable hawks in their midst, particularly in the Tanaka Fac-
tion. Of the three, the Nakasone Faction is the most difficult to ana-
lyze, boasting such outspoken doves as Oishi Sempachi (HR) as well 
as a considerable corps of more hawkish Diet members. Further-
more, as a faction leader, Nakasone is far less influential than the 
two strongest forces in Japanese politics today, Fukuda and Tanaka. 
9. Ito Soichiro, Seiron (Defense Information No. 3] (Tokyo: Sankei, 1982), p. 37. 
JAPANESE DEFENSE POLICY 43 
Despite his conviction in the Lockheed scandal, Tanaka Kakuei 
remains the foremost of the faction leaders. The Tanaka and 
Fukuda Factions are at a stand-off, so that neither will allow the 
premiership to the other, but Tanaka seems to be winning the battle 
of the behind-the-throne powers. Tanaka has been the more power-
ful influence on both of the Prime Ministers since Ohira's death, 
Suzuki and Nakasone. 
The Tanaka Faction appears to be the most hawkish of the fac-
tions, boasting such defense leaders and former JDA appointees as 
Kanemaru, Minowa, Yamashita, Esaki Masumi (HR), and Omura 
Joji (HR). The post of JDA Director-General is one of the few mi-
nor appointments for which Tanaka fights very hard, along with the 
Minister of Construction spot, because controlling large contracts 
such as those that are involved in the defense industry can be very 
lucrative for a politician. 10 Yet, all leaders should avoid going too 
far and getting caught, as Tanaka did. The Director-General spot 
should become more and more appealing as the defense industry 
grows, and defense industry support could drive the faction to take a 
more pro-defense stance. 
Tanaka's views on defense are uncertain, but his political ideol-
ogy leans to the right. As Prime Minister (1972-74), he stressed de-
fense consciousness more than military build-up, but this may have 
been a mere reflection of the political constraints of the time. He 
championed many nationalist causes, such as officializing the na-
tional anthen and the national flag and allocating public funds for 
the Yasukuni Shrine, which traditionally have been associated with 
militaristic views. 11 Because he has been out of the administration 
for so long, it is particularly difficult to decipher Tanaka's policy in-
clinations. The indication is, however, that he is above all a political 
realist, who would like to see defense expansion gradually accelerate 
in the future. 
Fukuda is more outspoken on the issue, but his stance is equally 
ambiguous. Although he is generally considered to be a supporter of 
stronger defense, the Fukuda Doctrine, articulated in his 1977 
speech at Manila, is one of the strongest statements for limits on 
defense: 
Historically, great economic powers have always been great 
10. Interview with Hiramoto Kazunori (Tanaka Faction Press Club), Tokyo Broad-
casting Service, Tokyo, Japan, 6 August 1982. 
II. The Yasukuni Shrine is a World War II war memorial. The issue of public sup-
port for this shrine has been a major source of conflict between the hawks and the doves 
in the Diet. 
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military powers as well. However, our country holds an 
unprecedented vision: that of protecting the safety and the 
lives of the world's people by trusting in their justice and 
fidelity. We are determined not to become a military 
powerY 
Despite this noble proclamation, Fukuda is foremost a realist, 
and if anything leans toward the hawk perspective. He has had close 
ties with the Seirankai and later the Nakagawa Group, and at times, 
he has had a rightist and nationalist sentiment reminiscent of the 
Meiji Era. This manifested itself in his support for patriotic educa-
tion, and for laws officializing that national anthem and the tradi-
tional Emperor's calendar. As Prime Minister (1976-78), he 
consistently pushed for increased public support for the SDF and he 
gave behind-the-lines support to JDA initiatives such as those con-
cerning crisis management and F -15 procurements. Although it has 
fewer vocal defense advocates than the Tanaka Faction, Otake 
Hideo claims that it is the Fukuda Faction which has the real poten-
tial to become a powerful defense lobby. 13 
The factional issues of the defense debate are not crucial in that 
the faction leader does not determine the policy choices of the fac-
tion members, and there is virtually no hope for a unified policy 
stance by any major faction. However, factions do play a role in the 
defense debate. First, factional leanings are important considera-
tions for decision makers, particularly for Cabinet Ministers who are 
at the same time part of this network of intra-party rivalries. Sec-
ond, the more powerful faction leaders can play a decisive role at 
key moments in the policy-making process, particularly at budget 
time. 
To date, Tanaka and Fukuda have supported the defense 
budget but have not cast much of their political capital in that direc-
tion. The stand-off between the two factions is a key factor here, 
because as the two most powerful factions and the two factions most 
supportive of defense, together they potentially could change the na-
ture of the domestic defense debate. For now, they are only pushing 
for incremental build-up of the nature that Mihara recommends. 
Their nationalistic tendencies indicate, however, that although they 
are taking a realist stand at this time, they eventually would like to 
see a much stronger and more influential Japan. 
12. As quoted in Otake series, part 14,Asahi Journal, (6 November 1981), p. 30. 
13. Otake series, part 21,Asahi Journal (25 December 1981), pp. 35-40. 
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The New Direction in Defense 
Political realism is by no means a new phenomenon in Japanese 
politics. To a large extent, the "conservative mainstream" (hoshu 
honryu) of the LDP has always been more concerned with the polit-
ical mood of the time than the content of the issues. In the defense 
debate, however, the present political realists represent an entirely 
new movement. 
Primarily due to the transformations of the seventies, they have 
drawn a very different conclusion on defense than the realists of the 
postwar consensus. The political realists of the fifties and the sixties 
supported the dove ideology as described in the beginning of Chap-
ter II. This ideology was accepted by the public, by Japanese allies, 
and by a firm majority in the Diet. It was particularly appealing 
because it had a logical foundation in the Peace Constitution and the 
numerous established limits on defense. It was thus a policy position 
both easily explained and easily justified. The political realists today 
see a very different picture. In order to understand the new realists' 
perspective, we must examine their assessment of the balance in the 
public, international, and domestic political arenas. 
Public views have slowly shifted in favor of defense. The ma-
jority of the people support the SDF, and there are a growing 
number who advocate significant rearmament. According to nation-
wide polls, from 1972 to 1980, those favoring an increase of SDF 
forces have risen from 10 percent to 25 percent, while those advocat-
ing a decrease have dwindled from 23 percent to 11 percent. Among 
LDP supporters, according to the 1980 poll, 34 percent favor an in-
crease while only 4 percent favor a decrease. Nevertheless, the ma-
jority still favor the status quo, and any rapid acceleration is likely to 
excite strong public opposition. 14 The media has become less critical 
of the military, while the business world (zaikai) is beginning to be 
actively supportive. Thus in the public arena, the political realists 
enjoy strong support for build-up so long as it remains at a moderate 
rate. 
In the international arena, while Japan's Asian neighbors would 
hardly welcome Japanese rearmament, they are becoming more tol-
erant of the notion. Specifically, Chinese support of both the SDF 
and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was crucial in this development. 
14. 1972 figures from Douglas H. Mendel, "Public Views of the Japanese Defense 
System," in James H. Buck, ed., The Modern Japanese Military System. Sage Research 
Progress Series on War, Revolution, and Peacekeeping, Vol. V, Beverly Hills: Sage, 
1975, p. 166. 1980 figures from Asahi shimhun (25 March 1980, evening edition), p. 3. 
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At the same time, the United States increasingly has pressured the 
Japanese in favor of military expansion. Given the overwhelming 
importance of U.S.-Japan relations, most realists concede that the 
Americans must be appeased on this issue. 
The mood in political circles is far more complex. On the one 
hand, the doves push for an end to defense expansion. The doves, 
however, have lost much political support to the realists. This is 
natural, of course, because the mainstream of political thought has 
switched from the dove ideology to an intermediate position. Fur-
ther, the doves rarely are concerned with defense issues, and are ex-
tremely unlikely to oppose gradual expansion of the defense budget. 
All in all, as argued in Chapter II, the dove cause has lost considera-
ble force. 
Meanwhile, the hawks are on the rise. They have not yet caught 
hold of the political mainstream, but they have become accepted as 
an alternative viewpoint. Furthermore, certain aspects of the hawk 
argument have a very strong appeal for the public and for the LDP 
in general. The military realists offer the military rationale and 
strategy that Japanese defense has lacked in the postwar era. The 
hawks' strongest appeal, however, is to Japanese nationalism. Even 
the purist of political realists are moved by the notion of a stronger 
and more respected Japan. 
Political realists realize that the constraints against rearmament 
still carry force, and that above all, expansion must be incremental. 
Dissent from the opposition parties, the LDP doves, and the Minis-
try of Finance, will not prove to be a major obstacle if sudden in-
creases are avoided. Even many of the hawks realize that the push 
for military expansion will be most successful if it is implemented 
gradually. The Sakata approach of slowly expanding without excit-
ing any opposition appears to be more successful than the Nakasone 
approach of actively supporting large-scale increases in defense 
forces. For this reason, many ideological hawks now support the 
realist position on short-term policy. This is the case in the "Defense 
Tribe," where hawk and realist perspectives unite in support of in-
cremental increases in defense spending. 
This policy consensus is manifested in the resolutions of the 
three LDP defense committees, traditional strongholds of the De-
fense Tribe. Ideologically, the position of these committees is un-
clear, but their policy recommendations clearly reflect the realist 
perspective. They emphasize comprehensive security rather than re-
armament, and they cite maintenance of the U.S.-Japan security 
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structure as a primary goal. 15 Nevertheless, at some points, they be-
tray a slightly more hawkish perspective: 
The United States, recognizing the 1980s as a period of in-
ternational "crisis," has requested defense efforts beyond 
the level prescribed in the Defense Outline of 1976. Keep-
ing this in mind, and given the present state of interna-
tional tension, we believe that Japan must accept a more 
independent position, revising the Outline and establishing 
a new defense plan for Japan. However, government pol-
icy has set realization of the present Outline as its main 
goal, and we feel that compliance with this policy is the 
most realistic means of advancing defense preparedness at 
the present time. 16 
Some critics argue that the Joint Defense Committee represents 
a very hawkish perspective, but actually the majority view in the 
party supports a similar line. According to a 1980 Nihon Keizai 
shimbun poll, 78.6 percent of LDP Lower House (HR) representa-
tives advocate expansion of the SDF and maintenance of the U.S.-
lapan Security Treaty, while only a handful, including Ishida 
Hakuei (HR) and Oishi Sempachi (HR), argue that the SDF should 
not be expanded. Another indication of the strength of the realists 
was that 50.5 percent said that the Soviet Union presents a potential 
threat, but is not likely to attack Japan in the near future. 41.4 held 
the more typically "hawkish" view that the Soviet Union poses a 
major threat, while almost none argued that there is no threat at 
all. 17 19.5 percent replied in favor of passing the GNP one percent 
limit, compared to only 7.9 percent which supported the dove stance 
of keeping this barrier. Once again, however, the political realist po-
sition dominated as 59.3 percent said that the one percent limit 
should be reached first, and then reconsidered. 18 
Thus the realists are dominant. At the same time, however, as 
defined here, the "hawk" views are stronger than the "dove" views in 
the LDP. While those ready to attack the established limits on de-
fense are still in the minority, many seriously question these limits. 
According to the poll, 46.4 percent oppose the arms export ban, 
while 31.8 percent favor it. More surprisingly, however, only 31.2 
15. LDP Political Affairs Research Council, Joint Defense Committee, "Boeiryoku 
seibi o meguru teigen" [Resolution Concerning Defense Preparation] (14 July 1982), p. l. 
16. Ibid. , p. l. 
17. Hino lchiro, ed., "Anzen hosho ko kangaeru" (5 part series), Nihon keizai 
shimbun (27 April-1 May 1980). Part l, 27 April 1980, p. 2. 
18. Ibid. , part 3 (29 April 1980), p. 2. 
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percent support the present Constitution, while 36.7 percent favor 
constitutional revision. 19 
The new realists will continue to lead defense policy for at least 
the next decade. They advocate incremental expansion of the SDF, 
and this gradual expansion characterizes the new direction in Japa-
nese defense policy. Throughout the 1980s, defense will remain as a 
top priority item on the budget continuing with spending increases in 
the 5-10 percent range. GNP one percent will be passed before the 
completion of the 1981 Mid-Range Plan in 1988. The growing 
strength of the hawk position and the strength of the hawk-realist 
alliance in the Defense Tribe suggests that defense expansion may 
accelerate, particularly if international tension heightens. 
In the next few years, incrementalism will guide defense policy. 
In the long run, however, incremental decisions could lead Japanese 
defense policy in any one of several very different directions. These 
incremental decisions are likely to build toward a new national con-
sensus on goals, and the nature of this national consensus will deter-
mine the future of Japanese defense. 
CHAPTER V 
TOWARD A NEW CONSENSUS ON DEFENSE 
Japanese defense policy has a new direction, pointing toward 
gradual military expansion, yet it lacks any clear rationale. In the 
era of the original postwar consensus, defense policy had a logical 
foundation in the Peace Constitution, which was further reinforced 
by the limitations established under the notion of "exclusive de-
fense." These basic principles gave the political choices of Yoshida 
and others an articulated rationale, which in tum gave force to the 
consensus on defense. The changes of the 1970s question this ration-
ale and now leaders search for a new defense strategy. 
Such a strategy is necessary for there to be any consensus on 
defense. Public support and political stability will not be achieved 
unless policy goals are clearly defined. This drive for a new basis for 
defense lay behind the public campaigns for Nakasone's "autono-
mous defense" and Sakata's "fundamental defense" strategy under 
the 1976 Outline, and the search continues today. A rationale is par-
ticularly important for the forces that favor military expansion. 
Without a clear strategy they will not be able to overcome the polit-
ical constraints against rearmament. In order to surpass the limits 
19. Ibid, part 4 (30 April 1980), p. 2. 
JAPANESE DEFENSE POLICY 49 
established under the Yoshida strategy, they will need a suitable re-
placement. Only then can they go beyond the present incremental 
build-up. 
Finding a strategy for Japanese defense is no easy task. Defense 
leaders are caught in an almost inescapable paradox. If the founda-
tion for Japanese defense is truly dependence on U.S. military 
power, then why should Japan have any military at all? Given that 
the present enemy is the Soviet Union, spending a few more percent 
of Japan's mighty GNP still will not stop even a small flock of SS-
20s from sinking the islands. On the other hand, if Japan cannot 
entirely depend on the United States, then why stop short of full-
scale rearmament complete with a nuclear deterrent? Ironically, the 
two most extreme positions, total disarmament and full-scale rearm-
ament, are the most logically defensible views for Japanese defense. 
Ishibashi Masashi, foremost advocate of unarmed neutrality, puts 
this even more strongly, saying that in the long run, there are only 
two alternatives for Japan: unarmed neutrality or a return to Japa-
nese militarism.' 
The Yoshida strategy provided a compromise between these 
two extremes in that it allowed for some defense within the context 
of a security relationship with the United States. Ishibashi argues 
that, even so, it was only a temporary stage on the eventual road 
toward militarism. Here, perhaps, he underestimates the force of the 
Yoshida consensus. It had much of the same logical appeal as un-
armed neutrality in that it negated any potential for significant mili-
tary power, and was based in firmly established principles. 
Nonetheless, this consensus has eroded, and if Ishibashi is to be 
proved wrong, a compromise strategy must be found. 
Kato Koichi (HR) suggested a compromise close to Yoshida's, 
but only more applicable to the present situation. The strategy sim-
ply is to maintain the U.S.-Japan security system, even compromis-
ing the limits on defense expansion if this is necessary to secure 
strong U.S.-Japan ties.2 Under this strategy, the SDF's only purpose 
is to appease the Americans. The argument lacks popular appeal, 
though, for few taxpayers would be happy to know that five percent 
of their taxes are spent on a gesture to the American government. 
Furthermore, the political momentum of the defense debate has 
moved beyond this point, for the new realists and the hawks see 
I. Ishibashi interview, supra Chapter II, note 6, 12 August 1982. 
2. Kato interview, supra Chapter II, note 5, 10 August 1982. 
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much more than simply quieting the Americans as their goals for 
defense. 
A similar strategy is that of "burden-sharing." Under this strat-
egy, Japanese defense is seen within the larger context of the East-
West conflict. The Western allies, it is argued, must counterbalance 
the Soviet threat with equal or superior military forces. As a mem-
ber of this alliance, Japan must do its part. This is a very common 
analysis in the new debate, and may be the most realistic strategy for 
Japanese defense today. However, many Japanese dislike the notion 
of Japan as no more than a part of some vague global strategy. They 
feel that Japanese defense can hardly make any difference in the 
global balance, and they thus fail to understand why Japanese efforts 
are necessary. 
Other possible compromise strategies reflect more of a military 
perspective. Aso Taro (HR) suggests that the Soviet Union has no 
reason to attack Japan alone, and that aggression would only take 
place in a global war. In this case, the Soviet armed forces would be 
concentrating on other fronts, only leaving a small percentage of 
their forces with which to attack Japan. Japanese defense, Aso ar-
gues, should be tailored to cope with this limited threat because it is 
the only realistic threat that faces Japan: 
If the Soviet Union directed its military power against Eu-
rope, against China, and against America, then what's left 
- that is the threat which we must be able to repel. This 
should be the standard. 3 
Under this strategy, it would be extremely difficult to calculate the 
level of "necessary defense." It fails to address the question of nu-
clear attack, which is a possibility even if the Soviet Union is fighting 
on other fronts. Finally, it lacks a strong appeal, for few would agree 
that Japan is not threatened by anything short of global war. 
An alternative military strategy involves a division of labor be-
tween U.S. and Japanese military forces. The Yoshida strategy in-
corporated such a division, but stressed defense against internal 
threats as the main responsibility of Japanese forces. Clearly the 
present SDF is designed for a more active role than this. Defense 
leaders have tried to offer alternative divisions of labor. The present 
JDA "strategy" provides that Japan must be able to repel a "limited 
small-scale attack" or be able to hold off a larger attack until help 
3. Aso interview, supra Chapter II, note 3, 23 July 1982. 
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arrives.4 Although this is the present official position, it has failed to 
satisfy political leaders or to convince the public. It is under increas-
ing criticism from the hawks, particularly the military realists, who 
say that this strategy is incomprehensible, and does not logically pro-
ceed to any particular policy. 
The military realists offer an alternative division of labor. The 
Center for Strategic Studies of Japan argues that Japan should be 
responsible for the defense of the mainland and for the protection of 
naval transportation lines, while depending on the U.S. nuclear um-
brella for deterrence of large-scale Soviet aggression. 5 This proposal 
offers a more cogent foundation than most other alternatives, yet it is 
still difficult to envision what the respective roles of U.S. and Japa-
nese forces would be in specific crisis contingencies. The Center and 
others are working on clarifying this. Nevertheless, they are still sus-
ceptible to the attack of the skeptics: why do anything if the U.S. 
nuclear umbrella works, and why stop rearming if it does not? 
There are, as stated earlier, two remaining possibilities if a com-
promise strategy cannot be found: disarmament and full rearma-
ment. Arguably, unarmed neutrality was a real possibility for Japan 
after the war, but this is no longer so. The reason is simple. Kato 
Koichi explains: 
The Japanese people, including myself, will never trust the 
Soviets enough to stand before them without arms.6 
A notion more difficult to accept is that for similar reasons, the Japa-
nese do not feel that they can rely solely on the United States for 
protection. The fact that the United States has refused to commit 
itself in terms of how it will respond to specific cases of aggression 
against Japan exacerbates the lack of trust. A 1978 Asahi poll 
showed that 56 percent of the Japanese people felt that American 
forces would not come to the rescue in the case of an attack on the 
Japanese homeland.7 Because they do not completely trust the 
Americans to protect them, the Japanese cannot possibly disarm. 
This puts to rest one side of the paradox: the Japanese need some 
arms because U.S. protection is not absolute. The flip side of the 
question remains: what will keep Japanese rearmament limited? 
The traditional answer would be that formidable constraints 
4. Interview with Fujishima Masanori, JDA, Tokyo, Japan, 29 July 1982. See De-
fense Agency, Defense of Japan, 1981, Tokyo: JDA, 1981, pp. 121-42. 
5. Kanemaru Shin and Minowa Noboru, ed., Ko sureba nihon wa mamoreru, To-
kyo: Center for Strategic Studies of Japan, 1981, pp. 116-25. 
6. Kato interview, supra note 2, 10 August 1982. 
7. Asahi Shimbun (I November 1978). 
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will prevent the hawks from attaining their goals, and will thus force 
a compromise short of full rearmament. However, these constraints 
are gradually losing force. The GNP one percent limit may be the 
first of these constraints to give in. It will be impossible to maintain 
under the 1981 Mid-range Plan as it now stands, and probably will 
be surpassed in the next several years. Judging from the public reac-
tion to the July, 1982 announcement of the Mid-Range Plan, which 
pointed to spending above one percent, this limit will be passed with 
very little public outcry. 
The Peace Constitution provides another constraint. It is re-
markable, however, that this is even an issue when the Constitution 
so clearly states that "land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war 
potential will never be maintained." There is no reasonable doubt 
that Japanese defense has long since stepped over this boundary. It 
remains as an important symbolic statement, but it is losing force. 
Resolutions calling for Constitutional revision are now common-
place and an LDP resolution is likely to pass within the next decade. 
Even if constitutional revision is logistically impossible, as many ar-
gue, it could very well be subject to further "reinterpretation." It is 
likely, for example, that the definition of the right to self-defense for 
Japan will be expanded to allow for Japanese participation in collec-
tive security arrangements. 
The principles underlying "exclusive defense" are likewise los-
ing power. An important element in the arms export ban was re-
tracted as Prime Minister Nakasone recently agreed to allow the 
export of military technology to the United States. Many Diet mem-
bers are also pushing for an end to the ban on overseas dispatch of 
troops so that Japan can participate in United Nations forces. The 
principle banning introduction of American nuclear weapons has 
been severely criticized in recent years, and former Ambassador 
Reischauer is not the only one to have claimed that it is regularly 
violated. This principle will be under fire even more in a few years 
when U.S. cruise missiles are scheduled to be shipped into the Asian 
theater. 
The strongest barrier is that against the production or posses-
sion of nuclear weapons. Even if Japan does build up an independ-
ent military capability, the Japanese people with the support of their 
Asian neighbors and even the superpowers, will resist Japanese nu-
clear armament. Some strategists suggest that Japanese defense pol-
icy may eventually follow this direction: full rearmament and 
independent defense against all conventional military threats with 
some minimal reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella for deterrence 
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against nuclear attack. Although the Japanese "nuclear allergy" still 
carries considerable force, nuclear armament will become more of a 
possibility as the war generation passes away and Japanese conven-
tional military forces grow in strength. Such prominent figures as 
Prime Minister Fukuda have mentioned the possibility of nuclear 
arms for Japan, and a number of defense experts in Japan advocate 
the idea.8 
The opposition parties, the Ministry of Finance, and the LDP 
doves all play a role as constraints in the present stage of incremental 
military expansion, and could indeed succeed in preventing full re-
armament. The opposition parties have been incapable of coun-
tering LDP defense policy in the past few years, but they might gain 
more force if defense expansion were to suddenly accelerate. For 
now, however, support for unarmed neutrality is on the decline, and 
the Komeito and the Democratic Socialist Party have begun to sup-
port defense. The Ministry of Finance (MOF) has been a major 
force in constraining defense expansion in the past five years, and 
will continue to play an important role. Nevertheless, the Ministry 
basically has accepted the LDP designated priority on defense for 
the budget. In the long term, the MOF is likely to be a force in 
retarding, but not halting, the expansion of the defense budget. 
As shown in Chapter II, the LDP doves have lost force as a 
constraint, yet many claim that they will reemerge as a powerful 
lobby if there is any sudden increase in the rate of defense expan-
sion. In this sense, the rate of expansion is key. Gradual accelera-
tion of defense expansion is not likely to meet within any significant 
opposition from the LDP. However, gradual change still can be very 
dramatic. This was the case in the seventies when incremental shifts 
transformed the Yoshida consensus into the new debate in the space 
of a decade. Similarly, gradual acceleration of defense expansion 
easily could lead to full rearmament before the year 2000. Oddly 
enough, if the hawks move too quickly, their cause is sure to be lost. 
The final constraint is the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Full re-
armament could be extremely detrimental to U.S.-Japanese rela-
tions, especially if the Japanese defense industry becomes very 
competitive. Japanese military strength would decrease American 
8. On Fukuda's statement and nuclear weapons, see Research Institute for Peace 
and Security, Asian Security, 1981, Tokyo: Research Institute for Peace and Security, 
1981, pp. 156-158. For a full discussion of the issue, see Herbert Passin, "Nuclear Arms 
and Japan," in William H. Overholt, ed.,Asias Nuclear Future. Studies of the Research 
Institution on International Change, Columbia University, Boulder, Colorado: West-
view, 1977, pp. 67-132. 
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political leverage over Japan and could eventually pose a threat to 
U.S. military supremacy. A decline in U.S.-Japan relations, how-
ever, is more likely to be a cause than an effect of Japanese rearma-
ment, and thus bilateral ties may already be weak when Japanese 
remilitarization becomes an issue. 
The constraints against rearmament are not yet dead, but they 
now are seriously questioned, and they could further lose force in the 
next decade. After ten years of slightly accelerated incremental 
build-up, the Japanese people, the media, and the politicians may be 
much more accustomed to the idea of a postwar Japanese military. 
Furthermore, the growing defense industry could become a far more 
influential interest group in Japanese politics, particularly if the arms 
export ban is lifted. 
International events, however, potentially could push the Japa-
nese to rearm. Any dramatic increase in Soviet military strength in 
Asia will accelerate Japanese rearmament. The growing acceptance 
of military realism suggests that future defense policy will react more 
rapidly to any Soviet military build-up, and that in the case of such a 
build-up, the military realists might be able to rally support for fun-
damental changes in defense policy. Likewise, political develop-
ments that make a Soviet attack appear more likely could inspire a 
similar reaction. U.S. military withdrawal from the region would 
even more clearly push the Japanese toward military expansion. 
Thus a significant change in Japan's military situation could lead to 
a scenario in which Japan alters its present course, opting to become 
an international military power. 
The most critical variable in guiding the future of Japanese de-
fense policy, however, will be the nature of Japanese relations with 
the Western allies, particularly the United States. If protectionism 
continues to rise in Europe and the United States, the effect on the 
Japanese economy could be devastating. Economic isolation could 
result in political isolation as well, as the Japanese develop a resent-
ment for this mistreatment by the West. This is particularly likely to 
cause international tension as the phenomenal postwar economic 
growth grinds to a halt. This isolation, economic deprivation, and 
the resultant feeling of resentment is most likely to feed the desire for 
a stronger military. 
These international factors will be pivotal in the future of de-
fense policy, but it is ultimately the Japanese people and their polit-
ical leaders, the LDP Diet members, who will make the decisions. 
Ishibashi argues that the LDP has never felt any remorse for the 
Japanese militarism of World War II. He explains that this senti-
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ment showed up vividly in 1982 when the government tried to re-
write the history textbooks used in secondary schools so as to play 
down the Japanese oppression against the Koreans and the Chinese 
during the war. He insists that prewar nationalism never left the 
hearts of the Japanese leaders, but was only suppressed out of polit-
ical necessity. This is why, he insists, it is only a matter of time 
before Japan once again becomes a great military power.9 
The Japanese people still have strong ties with their militaristic 
past. The leaders and the people of Japan share a common sense of 
nationalism, somewhat akin to that of the prewar era. This is why 
the hawk position, particularly that of the Nakagawa Group and 
Nakasone, carries such strong appeal. To this day, the Japanese feel 
a real sense of isolation in the international system. Many claim that 
mistreatment by others forced them to assert themselves in the first 
half of this century. A recent box-office smash, Dai nihon teikoku 
[The Great Japanese Empire] (1982), shows how economic isolation 
forced Japan into war. It then dramatically depicts the suffering of 
the Japanese people and their mistreatment by foreigners. The Japa-
nese people may once again feel oppressed and decide to assert 
themselves in the world. 
Many LDP leaders envision a stronger and prouder Japan. 
This vision is embodied in much of the hawk ideology, but is also 
shared by many of the realists. As these groups cooperate more and 
more, international events and domestic political shifts could result 
in a transformation more dramatic than the shift of power from the 
doves to the new realists which took place in the 1970s. The political 
mainstream could easily move on, from the realists to the hawks. 
9. Ishibashi interview, supra Chapter II, note 6, 12 August 1982. Ishibashi's views 
are put forth in Ishibashi Masashi, Hibuso churitsuron, (Tokyo: Shakai shinsha, 1980). 
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EPILOGUE 
The December 1983 election in the House of Representatives 
was an upheaval for Japanese politics, but did not result in any ma-
jor changes in defense policy. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 
lost thirty-six seats along with its majority in the House of Repre-
sentatives. Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro was held responsible 
for this defeat. Nonetheless he managed to stay in power, and even 
consolidated a stable majority by recruiting the support of nine in-
dependents and then forming a coalition government with the tiny 
New Liberal Club. This quick thinking and effective leadership dur-
ing the party's political crisis cleared the prime minister's name, and 
even revived his hopes for re-election in November. 
Some critics interpreted the election defeat as a negative re-
sponse to Nakasone's assertive stance on defense and foreign policy. 
In part, voters were voicing their displeasure over the problem of 
political ethics in the ruling party, which became the central issue in 
the election after former Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei refused to 
resign from the Diet despite his October 12, 1983 conviction in the 
Lockheed payoff scandal. Most importantly, however, the LOP's 
election defeat simply reflected the people's desire for a better bal-
ance in the Diet. The LDP won an overwhelming victory in the 1980 
double election, partly due to the sympathy vote after the sudden 
death of Prime Minister Ohira Masayoshi. Given that the number 
of seats in the House of Representatives won by the LDP has fluctu-
ated within the range of 248 to 288 for more than twenty years, it is 
no surprise that last year's election brought the ruling party back to 
earth with 250 seats after a high of 286 in 1980. 
The election has proved to have little effect on defense policy. 
In the wake of defeat, Prime Minister Nakasone appeared slightly 
more cautious on defense, pledging to keep defense spending within 
the limit of one percent of GNP. Nevertheless, he remains commit-
ted to an assertive foreign policy, as he confirmed in his new year's 
policy speech. Defense spending has continued to rise at a steady 
rate, with a 6.5 percent increase in fiscal 1983 and a 6.55 percent 
increase in fiscal 1984, despite the tightest budget in twenty-nine 
years. 
The election did, however, mark a transition for a number of 
the Diet members introduced in this study. Ishida Hakuei, a long 
time dove leader, retired, while Aso Taro, Hashiguchi Takashi, 
Nakao Eiichi, and Shionoya Kazuo all fell to defeat. Defense 
Agency Director-General Tanikawa Kazuo also lost, proving that 
the cabinet post is not necessarily one appreciated by the constitu-
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ents. Meanwhile, Hosoda Kichizo joined Prime Minister 
Nakasone's new cabinet on December 26 last year as Minister of 
Transportation, Sakamoto Misoji took over as Minister of Labor, 
and Kanemaru Shin became chairman of the LDP's General Affairs 
Council. 
Ishibashi Masashi, who is now chairman of the Japan Socialist 
Party, was cheered by his party's gain of twelve seats in the election 
for a total of 112 in the House of Representatives. Nevertheless, 
even Ishibashi, one of the last real doves, has begun to sell out on his 
policy of "unarmed neutrality." He has introduced a new policy 
which argues that the Self Defense Forces are legal, but still uncon-
stitutional. He thus gave up the clearest position in the entire de-
fense debate for one which is thoroughly incomprehensible, all in the 
name of being more "realistic." Ishibashi came under heavy fire last 
fall when he was successfully attacked by Prime Minister Nakasone 
for his "unrealistic" views on defense in a much publicized Budget 
Committee debate. 
The political mood of today, alas, still favors the moderate de-
fense build-up of the political realists. The doves and the hawks of 
the LDP, and now even the Socialists, are resigned to this fact. The 
realists' policy, with spending increases in the range of seven percent, 
will continue to prevail in the next few years. In the long run, how-
ever, as is argued in this paper, international tension could push Ja-
pan to accelerate defense expansion. Then the Japanese hawks may 
prove to be stronger, and the doves weaker, than Japan's allies ever 
expected. 
Steve Vogel 
January 1984 
Tokyo 
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APPENDIX 
PROFILES OF PRESENT DIET MEMBERS 
Akagi Munenori (HR- lbaraki 3rd), 79, Komoto Faction. For-
mer Director-General of the JDA (1959-60), Agriculture Minister, 
Secretary General of the Cabinet, Chairman of the LDP Political 
Affairs Research Council (PARC), Chairman of the LDP General 
Affairs Council. Elected fourteen times. 
Aso Taro (Formerly HR- Fukuoka 2nd), 43, Suzuki Faction. 
Former Party Youth League Director. Elected twice. 
Arima Motoharu (HR- Kagoshima 2nd), 63, Tanaka Faction. 
Former Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense (178-79) and La-
bor. Elected five times. 
Esaki Masumi (HR- Aichi 3rd), 68, Tanaka Faction. Former 
Director-General of the JDA (1960-61, 71-72), Minister of Interna-
tional Trade and Industry (MITI), Minister of Home Affairs, P ARC 
Chairman, Chairman of the LDP General Affairs Council. Elected 
fifteen times. 
Fukuda Takeo (HR- Gumma 3rd), 79, factiona1leader. Former 
Prime Minister (1976-78), Vice Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, 
Finance Minister, LDP Chief Secretary. Elected thirteen times. 
Genda Minoru (HC- nationwide), 79, no faction. Chairman of 
the LDP National Defense Committee. Former Air Force Chief-of-
Staff (1959-62). Elected five times. 
Hashiguchi Takashi (Formerly HR- Kagoshima 3rd), 70, 
Komoto Faction. Former Chairman of LDP Special Committee on 
Military Bases, Vice-Chairman of PARC and LDP General Affairs 
Council. Elected six times. 
Hosoda Kichizo (HR- Shimane), 71, Fukuda Faction. Minister 
of Transportation. Former Chairman of HR Special Committee on 
National Security, Director-General of JDA (1980), Director-Gen-
eral of the Government Management Agency. Elected nine times. 
Ishida Hakuei (Formerly HR- Akita 1st), 69, Komoto Faction. 
Former Transportation Minister, Labor Minister (four times). 
Elected fourteen times. 
Ishihara Shintaro (HR- Tokyo 2nd), 51, Nakagawa Group. Fa-
mous novelist. Formerly HC. Former Director-General of the En-
vironmental Agency. Elected five times. 
Ito Soichiro (HR- Miyagi 1st), 59, Komoto Faction. Former Di-
rector-General of the JDA (1981-82), Parliamentary Vice-Minister 
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of Agriculture and Science and Technology Agency. Elected eight 
times. 
Kanemaru Shin (HR- Yamanashi), 69, Tanaka Faction. Chair-
man of the LDP General Affairs Council. Former Director-General 
of the JDA (197-78) and Construction Minister. Elected ten times. 
Kato Koichi (HR- Yamagata 2nd), 44, Suzuki Faction. Chair-
man of LDP Agriculture Committee. Former Vice Secretary Gen-
eral of the Cabinet and MFA official. Elected five times. 
Kitakawa lshimatsu (HR- Osaka 7th), 65, Komoto Faction. 
Former Parliamentary Vice Minister of Home Affairs. Elected four 
times. 
Komoto Toshio (HR- Hyogo 4th), 72, factional leader. Direc-
tor-General of the Economic Planning Agency. Former MITI Min-
ister, Postal and Telecommunications Minister, PARC Chairman. 
Elected fourteen times. 
Mihara Asao (HR- Fukuoka 2nd), 74, no faction. Chairman of 
the LDP Investigative Committee on National Security. Former Di-
rector-General (1976-77) and Parliamentary Vice-Minister of the 
JDA (1967-68), and Director-General of the Development Agency. 
Elected eight times. 
Miki Takeo (HR- Tokushima), 76, no faction. Former Prime 
Minister (1974-76), Vice Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Director-
General of the Environmental Agency, LDP Chief Secretary. 
Elected eighteen times. 
Minowa Noboru (HR- Hokkaido 1st), 59, Tanaka Faction. 
Former Parliamentary Vice-Minister of the JDA (1972-73), Postal 
and Telecommunications Minister, Director-General of the Govern-
ment Planning Agency. Elected seven times. 
Mori Kiyoshi (HR- Aichi 2nd), 58, Nakagawa Group. Former 
Secretary General of the Ministry of Home Affairs. Elected three 
times. 
Morishita Motoharu (HR- Tokushima), 61, Nakagawa Group. 
Former Welfare Minister, Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Agricul-
ture and MITI. Elected seven times. 
Nakao Eiichi (Formerly HR- Yamanashi), 54, Nakagawa 
Group. Former PARC Chairman, Parliamentary Vice-Minister of 
Agriculture. Elected six times. 
Nakasone Yasuhiro (HR- Gumma 3rd), 65, factional leader. 
Prime Minister. Former Director-General of the JDA (1970-71) and 
the Science and Technology Agency, LDP Chief Secretary, Chair-
man of the LDP General Affairs Council, Transportation Minister, 
MITI Minister. Elected fifteen times. 
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Oishi Sempachi (HR- Shizuoka 1st), 48, Nakasone Faction. 
Former Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Welfare and Home Affairs. 
Elected five times. 
Omura Joji (HR- Okayama 1st), 64, Tanaka Faction. Former 
Director-General of the JDA ( 1980-81 ), Parliamentary Vice-Minis-
ter of Finance. Elected seven times. 
Sakamoto Misoji (HR- Ishikawa 2nd), 61, Komoto Faction. 
Minister of Labor. Former Parliamentary Vice-Minister of the En-
vironmental Agency. Elected seven times. 
Sakata Michita (HR- Kumamoto 2nd), 67, no faction. Former 
Director-General of the JDA (1974-76), Justice Minister, Welfare 
Minister, Education Minister. Elected sixteen times. 
Shiina Motoo (HR- lwate 2nd), 53, no faction. Vice-Chairman 
of the HR Special Committee on National Security. Elected three 
times. 
Shionoya Kazuo (Formerly HR- Shizuoka 3rd), 64, Komoto 
Faction. Former Chairman of the LDP General Affairs Council, 
Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Labor. Elected six times. 
Sonoda Sunao (HR- Kumamoto 2nd), 70, no faction. Former 
Foreign Minister (twice), Welfare Minister, Secretary General of the 
Cabinet. Elected fifteen times. 
Suzuki Zenko (HR- lwate 1st), 73, factional leader. Former 
Prime Minister (1980-82), Chairman of the LDP General Affairs 
Council, Agriculture Minister, Welfare Minister, Postal and Tele-
communications Minister. Elected fifteen times. 
Tsuji Hideo (HR- Fukuoka 1st), 64, Komoto Faction. Former 
Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs. Elected four times. 
Yamashita Kanri (HR- Shiga), 63, Tanaka Faction. Former 
Director-General of the JDA (1978-79). Elected seven times. 
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